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STANLEY V.ILLINOISS UNTOLD STORY
Josh Gupta-Kagan*
ABSTRACT
Stanley v. Illinois is one of the Supreme Courts more curious landmark cases.
The holding is well known: the Due Process Clause both prohibits states from remov-
ing children from the care of unwed fathers simply because they are not married and
requires states to provide all parents with a hearing on their fitness. By recognizing
strong due process protections for parents rights, Stanley reaffirmed Lochner-era
cases that had been in doubt and formed the foundation of modern constitutional
family law. But Peter Stanley never raised due process arguments, so it has long
been unclear how the Court reached this decision.
This Article tells Stanleys untold story for the first time, using original research
of state court and Supreme Court records. Those records show that the State was
concerned about Stanleys parental fitness and did not remove his children simply
because he was unmarried, as is frequently assumed. The State, however, refused
to prove Stanley unfit and relied instead on his marital status to justify depriving
him of custody. That choice, and Stanleys avoidance of a due process argument,
created a complicated Supreme Court decision-making environment.
This Article explores the Supreme Courts decision-making in Stanley and
reveals new insights both about Stanley and the Court more broadly. Four Justices
changed their votes from conference to the final decisionan extreme amount of
voting fluidity that shifted the case outcome. The Justices varying and evolving
views eventually led them to a strong due process holding even though Stanley did
not ask for one. This issue fluiditywhen the Court issues a ruling based on argu-
ments not raised by the partiesreflects a complex interaction between Justices
efforts to form a majority coalition and lawyers litigation choices. Finally, the Jus-
tices papers reveal how Justice Harry Blackmuns shift to the liberal wing of the
Courtand to a staunch parents rights votebegan with his angst over Stanley,
despite his vote for the State.
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INTRODUCTION
Stanley v. Illinois1 is one of the Supreme Courts more curious landmark cases.
The Court addressed Peter Stanleys efforts to regain custody of his children from
the Illinois foster care system after the death of his partner, Joan Stanley, to whom
he was not married.2 On equal protection grounds, Peter Stanley challenged an
Illinois statute that required a showing of parental unfitness against all mothers and
married fathers, but not unmarried fathers like him.3 Although the Supreme Court
issued substantive and procedural due process holdings, it seemingly only addressed
equal protection as a one-paragraph afterthought.4 This shift to due process trans-
formed Stanley from a case about a statutes treatment of unwed fathers into a
foundational case about parents rights to the custody of their children5 and it con-
tinues to inform important decisions about the scope of parental rights.6 The Court,
for the first time, recognized that nonmarital families have relationship rights important
enough to provide constitutional protection.7 It issued a broader holding under the
Due Process Clause that only parental fitness can justify state action to remove
children from their parents custody.8 In so doing, Stanley announced that the Court
would meaningfully apply pre-New Deal substantive due process family law cases
thus forming the foundation of modern constitutional family law.9
This Article explores Stanleys riddles. First, using original research into the
papers of the Justices on the Stanley Court and the state court records,10 this Article
explains the complicated facts that led to the litigation and the attorneys litigation
choices that further complicated the case for the Supreme Court Justices. The Supreme
Court decision reads as if state officials took custody of Peter Stanleys children
1 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
2 Id. at 64667.
3 Id. at 647.
4 Id. at 658.
5 MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHATS WRONG WITH CHILDRENS RIGHTS 64 (2005).
6 See, e.g., In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d 524, 53234, 539 (Mich. 2014) (holding that an
adjudication of one parents unfitness does not suffice to deprive the other parent of custody,
and overturning earlier cases to the contrary (citing Stanley, 405 U.S. 645)).
7 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
8 Id. at 65758.
9 Id. at 651 (citing various pre-New Deal cases as the foundation for the Courts due
process holding).
10 ThepapersofJustices HarryBlackmun, WilliamBrennan, WilliamO.Douglas,Thurgood
Marshall, and Byron White are available at the Library of Congress. The papers of Justice
Potter Stewart areavailableatYale University. These papers includedraft opinions, memoranda
from Justices and clerks, and Justices notes from conference. Records from the Illinois
Supreme Court litigationincluding the trial court transcript, petition, and other pleadings
are available at the Illinois State Archives. Documents from these sources are cited throughout
as on file with author.
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solely because he was unmarried and Joan Stanley had died; despite that, the full
story is more complicated. The State had legitimate concerns about Stanleys parental
fitnessa court had found that he had neglected his eldest child.11 But the State
chose to avoid litigating his fitness and instead sought custody based on Stanleys
marital status.12
Stanleys lawyers added to the complexity. They challenged the notion that marital
status could suffice to deprive a father of custody of his childrenan argument they
could have framed on equal protection and due process grounds.13 But in an uncer-
tain doctrinal landscape in which the reach of the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses remained unclear, his lawyers chose narrower grounds through which to
push their argument. Theyraised an equal protection challengeand argued that discrim-
inating against unmarried fathersas compared to all mothers and married fathers
had no rational basis; they neither asked for heightened scrutiny nor explicitly raised
a due process argument.14
Second, this Article uses the Justices papers to answer for the first time a question
long posed by scholarswhy and how did the Court broaden the case to reach a due
process holding?15 Four Justicesa majority of the seven who participated in
Stanleychanged their votes during the Courts deliberations.16 This is a rare and
extreme example of voting fluiditysomething noteworthy by itself, as it perhaps
represents the greatest amount of documented vote switching in a single case.17
Moreover, such vote switchingand the need to build a stable majority coalition in
the midst of unstable votesexplains the Courts due process holding. Crucially,
Justice William Douglasusually a dependable vote for individual rightsfirst
sided with the State at conference, likening unwed fathers to hit-and-run drivers.18
Douglas soon switched his vote, but refused to accept Stanleys equal protection
11 Transcript of Proceeding at 10, In re Stanley & Stanley, Nos. 69J4773, 69J4774, (Ill.
Cir. Ct. Juv. Div. May 16, 1969) (on file with author) (the prosecutor notes on the record that
in a prior proceeding the court found that Stanley neglected his eldest child). The Stanley
case discussed in this Article actually involves Stanleys two younger children. See Stanley,
405 U.S. at 646 n.2.
12 Brief for Respondent at 89, Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (No. 70-5014).
13 Brief for the Petitioner at 69, Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (No. 70-5014).
14 See generally id.
15 See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY
AND PRACTICE 670 (5th ed. 2014) (noting that the decision and reasoning in Stanley raised
many questions); SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON & D. KELLY WEISBERG, ADOPTION AND AS-
SISTED REPRODUCTION: FAMILIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION 19 (2009) (posing similar ques-
tions as to why the Court decided Stanley on due process reasoning).
16 See infra Part II.BC.
17 See, e.g., Saul Brenner, Fluidity on the United States Supreme Court: A Reexamination,
24 AM. J. POL. SCI. 526, 53031 (1980).
18 Justice Douglas, 2d Draft Opinion at 4, Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (Nov. 4, 1971)
(dissenting) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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argument, and insisted on a due process holding.19 Justice Byron Whitewhose
draft dissent evolved into the majority opinionaccommodated Douglas by writing
a due process holding.20 This opinion then overcame the doubts from other Justices
about whether relying too frequently on due process would invite Lochner-era ghosts
to return to the Court.21
Third, this Article reveals how the Stanley decision became such a strong due
process holding. Although Douglas insisted on a due process focus, Justice Thurgood
Marshall pushed for greater protections for parental rights and drafted a never-
published concurring opinion that articulated such protections.22 Marshalls work
induced White to strengthen the opinion from initial drafts, adopting essential elements
of the ultimate holding. Whites initial drafts would not have required hearings on
parental fitness, but, pressured by Marshall, the Court adopted a fitness standard as
the central constitutional protection for parents and childrens family integrity, rather
than a best-interest standard.23
This strong due process focus had enormous ramifications for family law.
Stanley confirmed that pre-New Deal due process decisions establishing parental
rights continued to have force and applied them for the first time to state action to
remove children. In so doing, Stanley became the modern basis for standard pro-
nouncements about parents right to care, custody, and control of their children in
a variety of legal contexts.
The vote switching, which led to the due process holding, also yields important
insight about Supreme Court decision-making. Justice William Brennans vote switch
is particularly noteworthy. The full record of the case suggests that Brennan strategi-
cally voted with the State at conference to ensure that the Court would dismiss the
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, rather than issue a decision on the merits
for the State. It also suggests that he immediately changed his vote to support Stanley
as soon as it became clear that such a switch would make a majority.24 Stanley
would thus be a rare documented instance of a damage control vote against a Jus-
tices true preferences.
19 Letter from WHA, Clerk for Justice Douglas, to Justice Douglas (Feb. 4, 1972), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE (Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II &
Forest Maltzman eds., 2011) [hereinafter Letter fromWHA to Douglas], http://www.supreme
courtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-5014.pdf [http://perma.cc/K48V-QR48].
20 Id.
21 MemorandumfromJustice White to the Conference on Stanleyv. Illinois, No. 70-5014
(Dec. 3, 1971), in THE BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE (Paul J. Wahlbeck,
James F. Spriggs, II & Forest Maltzman eds., 2011), http://www.supremecourtopinions
.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-5014.pdf [http://perma.cc/K48V-QR48].
22 Justice Marshall, 1st Draft Opinion at 37, Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (Nov. 19,
1971) (concurring) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
23 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (holding that as a matter of due process
of law, [a parent is] entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children [are]
taken from him).
24 See infra notes 36265 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, a close analysis of the vote switching and multiple opinion drafts
provides insight into Court decision-making not possible through empirical studies.
Stanley illustrates the intersection of multiple phenomena typically discussed sepa-
rately in the Supreme Court decision-making literaturestrategic voting, voting
changes, and litigation errors leading to the Court substituting its own framing of the
issues for the litigants. The Supreme Courts deliberations in Stanley illustrate the
complex interactions between those features and the difficult task of crafting a ma-
jority opinion that maintains an evolving majority coalition.
Justice Harry Blackmuns vote switcheshe voted for the State at conference,
joined an early draft in favor of Stanley, then joined the dissentare notable because
they reveal the seeds of his later shift to a strong supporter of parental rights.25
Blackmuns papers reveal how he both struggled in Stanley and finally sided with
the State on procedural groundshe did not believe the Court should address due
processrather than the merits of the case.26 This belief helps explain his shift over
the ensuing decade to a consistent vote for unwed fathers rights in private family
law cases27 and for parents rights in child protection cases.28 Blackmuns shift to the
parents rights side of the Court was solidified seven years later in Caban v. Moham-
med, when he resisted Justice Burgers entreaties and became the decisive fifth vote
for the unwed father challenging the adoption of his children.29
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I explains Stanleys underlying facts and
litigation. It begins at the trial court, explaining why the State likely took custody of
Stanleys children and the impact of the States decision to rest its case on Stanleys
25 Justice Douglas, Conference Notes on Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (Oct. 22, 1971)
[hereinafter Justice Douglas, Conference Notes] (transcribed) (on file with author) (noting
Justice Blackmuns inclination to affirm the state court); Letter from Justice Blackmun to
Chief Justice Burger (Mar. 13, 1972), in THE BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE
(Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II & Forest Maltzman eds., 2011) [hereinafter Letter
from Blackmun to Burger], http://www.supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs
/1971/70-5014.pdf [http://perma.cc/K48V-QR48] (writing Chief Justice Burger to join his
dissent); Letter fromJustice Blackmun to Justice White (Nov. 19, 1971), in THEBURGERCOURT
OPINION WRITING DATABASE (Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II & Forest Maltzman
eds., 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Blackmun to White], http://www.supremecourtopinions
.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-5014.pdf [http://perma.cc/K48V-QR48] (writingJustice
White to join his opinion).
26 Letter from Justice Blackmun to Justice White (Mar. 13, 1972), in THEBURGERCOURT
OPINION WRITING DATABASE (Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II & Forest Maltzman
eds., 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Blackmun to White], http://www.supremecourtopinions
.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-5014.pdf [http://perma.cc/K48V-QR48] (explaining
that he did not think that due process [could] be brought into the case).
27 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
28 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Lassiter v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 452
U.S. 18 (1981).
29 441 U.S. 380.
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marital status rather than his parental fitness. Part I also explains the choices that
Stanley and his lawyer faced in determining which arguments to raise on appeal, and
suggests reasons why they made only equal protection and not due process argu-
ments. Part II then describes how the Supreme Court Justices reached their decision,
and then analyzes the voting fluidity and the opinion-drafting process, which began
with a 52 conference vote for the State and ended with a 52 strong due process
holding for Stanley. Part II also explains the ambiguous aftermath for Peter Stanley
and his two youngest children. Part III analyzes the Courts deliberations in light of
the existing Supreme Court decision-making literature. Although most of that literature
provides empirical studies of large numbers of cases, Part II provides a close analy-
sis of a single case. In so doing, this Article is able to identify the interactions between
strategic voting, voting fluidity, and issue fluidity (in which the Court decides an
issue not presented by the partieshere, due process) both at conference and during
the opinion-writing process. Part III also analyzes what Stanley tells us about Justice
Blackmuns evolution on the Court. This Article concludes by explaining the im-
portance of the Stanley decision-making process and, in particular, how the broad
due process holding firmly established family integrity rights in the modern era,
laying the groundwork for future constitutional family law cases.
I. STANLEY V. ILLINOIS: UNDERLYING FACTS, LITIGATION, AND
CHOICE OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
The facts of Stanleyat least the facts recited by the Supreme Courtare de-
ceptively straightforward. Peter Stanley and Joan Stanley lived together in Chicago
for many years but never married.30 They had three children together.31 And when
Joan Stanley died, the State of Illinois took custody of the two youngest children and
placed them in foster care, relying on a state statute that deemed unwed fathers to
lack standing as legal parents.32 Based on these facts, the Supreme Court focused on
Illinoiss statute that cared only about an unwed fathers marital status rather than
his ability to parent.33
The Court, however, only focused on that statute because the state agency chose
to use it, and that choice obscured the Stanley familys struggles on which the trial
court case should have focused. The Court wrote that [u]nder Illinois law, the
children of unwed fathers become wards of the State upon the death of the mother,34
suggesting that foster care was the automatic result of both Joan Stanleys death and
the absence of a marriage between her and Peter Stanley. Indeed, this is how the
case is generally presented in law school casebooks, other academic work, and the
30 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972).
31 Id.
32 Stanleyv. Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ill. 1970), revd sub nom. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
33 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 64647.
34 Id. at 646.
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mass media.35 However, the State had the ability to choose whether to file a case to
declare children wards of the state.36 The State did so in Stanley because of legiti-
mate concerns about his ability to raise his children, and used Stanleys marital
status to avoid litigating his suspected unfitness.37 Stanleys trial further raised con-
cerns about the family courts overall fairnesshe was forced to a trial without
counsel despite requesting it, and neither the judge nor the State made any effort to
ensure that the real concerns about Stanley were heard in court.38 His children were
quickly placed into foster care and he was not given a clear procedure for determin-
ing when, if ever, he could reunify with them.39
Stanleyretained lawyerPatrickMurphywhorecognized that theseprocedures were
flawed and was eager to fight to reform family court.40 Murphy went to great efforts to
remain Stanleys lawyer, despite having an apparent conflict of interest.41 Murphychal-
lenged the trial court procedures and the statute on which they were based.42 Stanleys
lawyer also nearly lost the case by only framing his arguments in equal protection
termshe attacked the statute for only declaring children of unwed fathers to be
dependent and treating children of unwed mothers or wed fathers differently.43
35 See, e.g., ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 15, at 665 (presenting Stanley in a chapter on adop-
tion without discussing concerns about Stanleys parental fitness); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 803 (3d ed. 2006) ([T]he children were
taken from the father and placed into the states guardianship . . . simply because the Stanleys
had never been married.); David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional
Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 759 (1999) (When Joan Stanley
died, the State of Illinois declared their children wards of the state in a dependency pro-
ceeding and placed them with court-appointed guardians . . . .); Thai Phi Le, Birth Fathers
+ Adoptions: Inequality in Parental Rights, WASH. LAW. (2014), http://www.dcbar.org/bar
-resources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/february-2014-birth-fathers.cfm
[http://perma.cc/WHB8-CXX7] (When Joan died, the children automatically became wards
of the state.); Kevin Noble Maillard, A Fathers Struggle to Stop His Daughters Adoption,
ATLANTIC (July 7, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/paternity-reg
istry/396044/ [http://perma.cc/YBK6-NBEU] (Upon [Joan Stanleys] death, the state took
their three children and gave them to court-appointed guardians.).
36 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.
37 Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 11, at 10.
38 Id. at 78 (a proceeding appointing the Ness couple as guardians over the Stanley
children).
39 Id. at 11.
40 Murphy was a legal services attorney who had recently started an organization repre-
senting clients in juvenile court cases. As a legal services provider, he did not charge Stanley
a fee. InterviewwithJudge PatrickT. Murphy, Circuit Judge, 5th Mun. Dist. Domestic Relations
Div., State of Ill. Circuit Court of Cook Cty., in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 27, 2014) [hereinafter April 2014
Interview with Murphy] (now-Judge Patrick Murphy was the attorney for Peter Stanley).
41 See infra notes 7991 and accompanying text.
42 Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 11, at 1213.
43 See generally Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 13.
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This Section will first describe the factual and trial court history of Stanley and
then describe the strategic choices that Stanleys lawyer confronted when choosing
which issues to raise in his appeals to the Illinois state courts and United States
Supreme Court.
A. Family Court Proceedings
A review of Stanley v. Illinoiss beginnings in Cook County Family Court reveals
several key features essential to the Supreme Courts ultimate ruling. First, the case
began with real questions about Peter Stanleys parental fitnessquestions that were
never definitively answered because the State chose to litigate Stanleys marital
status rather than his fitness.44 Second, Stanley only became a landmark Supreme
Court case because Stanley retained a crusading lawyer, Patrick Murphy, who was
eager to challenge long-standing family court practices and to find a way to repre-
sent Stanley despite an apparent conflict of interest.45 Murphys representation
pushed Stanleys case to the Supreme Courtbut Murphy could have lost the case by
failing to raise explicit due process arguments.46
Peter and Joan Stanley lived together in Chicago intermittently and had three
children together.47 Peter asserted that Joan was his common-law spouse, an identity
his lawyers noted at various points during the litigation,48 and they even used a single
family name.49 Yet, for reasons not established in the record, Peter and Joan never mar-
ried. Illinois had outlawed common-law marriage decades earlier,50 so their relation-
ship had no recognized legal status.
44 Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 11, at 10.
45 Id. at 59.
46 See generally Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 13.
47 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 648 (1972).
48 Chief Justice Burger of the United States Supreme Court opened oral argument for
Stanley v. Illinois on October 19, 1971. Oral Argument at 0:00, Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (No.
70-5014), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-5014. AttorneyPatrickMurphy, representing
Peter Stanley, began his oral argument by stating that [f]or 18 years, Peter Stanley lived
with his common-law wife. Id. at 0:43. Chief Justice Burger then forced him to acknowledge
that Illinois banned common-law marriage; he stated, I am using [the phrase common law
marriage] in the generic sense of the word. He lived with a woman for 18 years whom he
called his wife. Id. at 1:12. At trial, Peter testified that Joan was his wife. Transcript of Pro-
ceeding, supra note 38, at 19. Stanley first requested a continuance so he could produce a
marriage certificate, but never produced one. Id. at 2.
49 Although it is possible that Joan was born with the last name Stanley, it is unclear
whether she had changed her name. During a 2014 interview, now-Judge Murphy could not
recall whether she did but said that he assumed she took Peters last name. April 2014
Interview with Murphy, supra note 40.
50 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 66364 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
2016] STANLEY V. ILLINOISS UNTOLD STORY 781
Whatever their reasons for not formalizing their relationship with each other, there
was no doubt about Peters paternity of their three children: Karen,51 Peter Jr. (born in
1966), and Kimberly(born in 1968).52 Peter and Joan raised all three children together.53
Peter Sr. gave unrebutted testimony that he was their father,54 no party ever challenged
his paternity,55 and the State named him as the father in its petitions.56 Peter, Joan,
and the three children formed a family until Joans death on September 20, 1968.57
State intervention soon followed. In the months after Joans death, the Juvenile
Division of the Cook County Circuit Court found that Stanley neglected Karen and
gave custody of her to the State, which placed her in a foster home.58 Concern about
Stanleys parental fitness likely motivated the State to intervene regarding his two
younger children, especially in the wake of his adjudicated neglect of Karen. Stanleys
lawyer, Patrick Murphy, later conceded at oral argument before the Supreme Court
that Stanleys adjudicated neglect of Karen may have been something to do with
charges being brought regarding the other two children.59 Karen Stanley never
reunited with her father during her childhood.60 Although it was not addressed in the
younger childrens trial, Peter Stanley was possibly an alcoholic, as described by his
lawyer, Patrick Murphy, in a 2014 interview.61
51 Karen was not party to the case that reached the Supreme Court, so her birth date is not
included in the publicly available court records. In-court testimony suggests, however, that
she was at least ten years old; a probation officer testified that Peter Stanley lived with Joan
and the children for approximately ten years after she had Karen. Transcript of Proceeding,
supra note 38, at 17.
52 Id. at 1718.
53 The probation officer acknowledged that Peter Stanley lived with Joan Stanley from
Peter Jr.s and Kimberlys births onwards. Id.
54 Id. at 19.
55 The States attorney said at trial, [W]e are not here attempting to state or stipulate that
the father is not the natural father of these children, just that there is no legal parent
surviving, and therefore, these children are dependant children under the Statute. Id. at 6.
The State later opened its oral argument by describing the children as those assumed to be
[Peter Stanleys] because there ha[d] been no proof that Peter Stanley in fact [was] the
father. Oral Argument, supra note 48, at 25:52, 35:22.
56 Petition in Support of Motion to Vacate Order, In re Stanley, No. 69JO4773 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. Juv. Div. Mar. 21, 1969) [hereinafter Petition in Support of Motion to Vacate] (on file
with author).
57 Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 38, at 17.
58 Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 11, at 10. The court probation officer testified that
[t]here is a Finding of Neglect in Karens case and that she was then living in a foster home.
Id. There is no description of what specific action was found. Id. This history regarding Karen
is discussed in the case files of Peter Jr. and Kimberly. Id. It was those latter cases that became
the Supreme Court case Stanley v. Illinois, and only they became available for public view. See
Stanleyv. Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814 (Ill. 1970). Thecase involvingKarenStanleyremains sealed.
59 Oral Argument, supra note 48, at 21:33.
60 April 2014 Interview with Murphy, supra note 40.
61 Id.
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Peter sent his two younger children to live with friends of histhe Ness family.62
His precise reasons are unclearperhaps he felt his work schedule did not permit
him to parent two young children, or perhaps some mix of grief, alcohol use or abuse,
stress from the case involving Karen, awareness that he was not then able to raise his
children well, or concern that the State would remove them from his custody led him
to conclude that living with the Nesses would serve his two younger children best.
Soon after the trial in the younger childrens case, his lawyer wrote that Stanley had
his children live with the Nesses while he was attempting to get back on his feet
emotionally.63 Whatever the full reasons, parents frequently permit their children
to live with other adult caregivers without triggering allegations of neglect.
The State of Illinois then intervened, filing a petition on April 1, 1969, alleging
that Peter Stanley had neglected his two youngest children, but without specifying
how Stanley had done so.64 Rather than prove this unspecified neglect, the State
amended its petition to allege only that the children were dependent because an
Illinois statute did not recognize unwed fathers as having parental rights.65 By
amending the petition to allege dependency rather than neglect, the State only had
to prove that Peter Stanley was not married and that Joan Stanley had died; those
facts would establish that, under the then-existing law, the children had no legal
parents and were per se dependent.66 The State did not have to show that Stanley had
done anything wrong as a parent, nor did it even have to show that foster care would
62 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 667 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Stanleys counsel
described his action this way: He left his children with his long time and trusted friend, the
Nesses and he said, Would you take care of them? . . . [S]ame thing that a wed father might
have done. Oral Argument, supra note 48, at 6:30.
63 Patrick T. Murphy, NLADA Juvenile Court Project, 27 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 224,
232 (1969).
64 The petition states [t]hat the said minor is a neglected minor by reason of the fol-
lowing: he is neglected as to care necessary for his well being. Petition in Support of
Motion to Vacate, supra note 56 (emphasis indicates text typed into a form petition).
65 See Transcript of Record at 3, In re Stanley& Stanley, No. 42489 (Ill. Sept. 29, 1969) (on
file with author) (arguments on appeal before the Illinois Supreme Court); see also Transcript
of Proceeding at 3, Illinois v. Stanley, Nos. 69J004774, 69J004773 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Juv. Div.
Apr. 15, 1969) (on file with author) (initial appearance before the Juvenile Court). The States
precise reasons for amending the petition are not divulged in the record. Stanleys attorney
suggested that the State realized a neglect finding could not be proved against the father
[Stanley]. Murphy, supra note 63, at 232. It is not clear from the publicly available case
record whether the State believed it could not prove neglect or if it would be easier to prove
dependency. Either way, the State declined to drop the case and continued to seek a court
order placing the two younger children in its custody, suggesting that it continued to harbor
concerns about Stanleys parental fitness.
66 See Stanley v. Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 825 (Ill. 1970), revd sub nom. Stanley, 405
U.S. 645.
2016] STANLEY V. ILLINOISS UNTOLD STORY 783
serve the childrens best interests.67 Hearing proof that no marriage existed,68 the
court ruled the children dependent and placed them in foster care with the Nesses.69
Because the State amended its petition to avoid litigating its allegation that
Stanley was an unfit parent, essential facts are absent from the record. Was Peter
Stanley a fit parent who appropriately decided that his children needed to live with
someone else temporarily? Or did Peter Stanleys neglect of Karen Stanley affect
his parenting of the younger children, and, if so, how? Did alcohol use affect his
parenting, and, if so, how? The case record does not reveal answers. That loss is the
effect of the States litigation choice. By focusing on Stanleys marital status rather
than his parental fitness, there is no way for the courts involved to assess his fitness, or
whether foster care was necessary to protect Peter Jr. and Kimberly, or to determine
what rehabilitative steps he ought to have followed as a condition of reunification.
Even the States motivation for seeking custody of Stanleys children remains
somewhat contested. Stanleys attorney, Patrick Murphy, alleged in a book that the
State did not like Stanleys attitude toward his children after Joan Stanleys
death.70 The State framed the issue differently in court but never articulated in court
pleadings or hearings a detailed reason why it sought to remove the children from
Stanley.71 The States initial petition simply alleged that the children were ne-
glected as to care necessary for [their] well being, without specifying any details.72
The probation officer who filed the petition stated in juvenile court:
I was concerned about the welfare of the children [Peter Jr. and
Kimberly] and at the time that Karens case came into court, the
whereabouts of these two children were unknown and I felt that
the father was not in a state of mind to actually provide proper
care for the children.73
The law presuming the children to be dependent meant both that the State never had
to justify its position and that the court did not have to determine whether Stanleys
neglect of his eldest daughter or his possible alcohol abuse required the protection
of his younger children or whether Stanley had acted appropriately by leaving them
temporarily in his family friends custody.
67 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650.
68 Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 65, at 1415.
69 Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 38, at 22.
70 PATRICK T. MURPHY, OUR KINDLY PARENTTHE STATE: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND HOW IT WORKS 15 (1974).
71 See Transcript of Initial Proceeding at 2, In re Stanley & Stanley, Nos. 69J004773,
69J004774 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Juv. Div. Apr. 1, 1969) (initial appearance and continuance of case
before the juvenile court); Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 38, at 11.
72 Petition in Support of Motion to Vacate, supra note 56.
73 Transcript of Initial Proceeding, supra note 71, at 2.
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Stanley retained Patrick Murphy as his lawyer.74 Murphy was a self-described
activist leading Chicagos new Juvenile Legal Aid Society. In a 1974 book, he de-
scribed his firm as practicing [Saul] Alinsky lawusing a variety of legal actions
(some valid, some spurious), investigations, and intelligent use of the media to try
to move, embarrass, and change bureaucracies.75 Murphy used these tactics in his
effort to reform both juvenile court and the state agencies that took custody of
children deemed delinquent, dependent, or neglected by the court.76 Murphy had not
specifically targeted the statute discriminating between unwed mothers and fathers
until Peter Stanley sought him out.77 In a 2014 interview, Murphy said he did not take
the case to the Supreme Court for reform purposes but that he merely sought to repre-
sent Peter Stanley, who was an engaging client to whom it was hard to say no.78
One may suspect that Murphys motivations were more complexthat this self-
described activist litigator saw this case as a tool to reform juvenile court. Such a
motivation would explain why Murphy went out of his way to take Stanleys case.
Murphy met Stanley when he represented Karen Stanley in the earlier case stem-
ming from Stanleys neglect of her.79 By Murphys account, Stanley told him,
[Y]ou were the only fair person in the courtroom in Karens case.80 Murphys
prior representation of Karen Stanley in a case that found her father unfit posed conflict
of interest challenges for representing Stanley in another case in which Stanley
claimed to be a fit parent.81 Indeed, Murphys firm sought to withdraw from repre-
senting Stanley at trial due to the conflict, and the court granted leave to withdraw.82
But Murphy and his associates83 could not stay out of the case, especially as they
witnessed juvenile court procedures that appeared to steamroll Stanley. Immediately
after Murphys firm withdrew, the judge asked Stanley if he was ready to proceed
74 See Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 11, at 1.
75 MURPHY, supra note 70, at 14.
76 Id. at 1215.
77 See id. at 14 (Murphy describing how he identified various issues for reform, and then
happened upon the treatment of unwed fathers). Murphy also noted that the statute which
discriminated against unwed fathers was not a significant issue in many cases, but that it
was still wrong. See Telephone Interview with Judge Patrick T. Murphy, Circuit Judge, 5th
Mun. Dist. Domestic Relations Div., State of Ill. Circuit Court of Cook Cty. (Oct. 26, 2015)
[hereinafter October 2015 Telephone Interview with Murphy].
78 April 2014 Interview with Murphy, supra note 40.
79 Murphy assisted in switching payment of Karens social security benefits from Peter
Stanley to her legal guardian, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services. Id.;
see also Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 11, at 4.
80 Telephone Interview with Judge Patrick T. Murphy, Circuit Judge, 5th Mun. Dist. Do-
mestic Relations Div., State of Ill. Circuit Court of Cook Cty. (Mar. 14, 2014) [hereinafter
March 2014 Telephone Interview with Murphy].
81 See Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 38, at 4.
82 Id. at 36.
83 On one of the court dates, an associate of Murphys, Fred Meinfelder, appeared. Id.
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even though he no longer had a lawyer.84 Stanley responded, Gee, I would like to
acquire an attorney, but the court proceeded anyway.85 Murphys associate then
proceeded to participate in the hearing as a friend of the Court,86 but operated
essentially as Stanleys lawyercross-examining the States witness, examining
Stanley, and making an argument to the judge that Stanleys children were not
dependent.87 Ten days later, after the judge had declared Stanleys two younger
children dependent and Stanley had asked Murphy to appeal, Murphy filed a motion
to vacate on Stanleys behalf and asked the court to permit him to reappear.88
Murphy argued that the case involving Karen Stanley had been resolved so that no
present conflict existed and noted that no other attorney could practically represent
Stanley.89 Despite an attorneys ongoing obligation to former clients such as Karen
Stanley,90 the court permitted Murphys appearance.91
The possible conflict between representing Karen Stanley and Peter Stanley
would have been even more apparent had facts that arose at a later point been known
at the time the younger childrens case was tried. Later media reports stated that
Stanley was accused of molesting his eldest daughter, Karen.92 These allegations did
not arise during the trial courts consideration of the younger childrens case, and
it cannot be determined from available public records when Illinois authorities
became aware of the sex abuse allegations. Still, concerns about possible molesta-
tion impacted the Supreme Courts deliberations.93
Murphy soon challenged various aspects of the statute and the family courts
treatment of Stanley, though the specific doctrinal grounds for these challenges were
84 Id. at 78.
85 Id. at 8.
86 Id. at 9.
87 Id. at 1722.
88 Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 11, at 4.
89 Id. at 56, 910.
90 Rule 1.9(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct bars lawyers from repre-
senting one party in a substantially related matter when a former clients interests are
materially adverse to the potential new client. Since both the case regarding Karen Stanley
and the cases regarding her younger siblings raised questions about Peter Stanleys fitness,
especially in the period after their mothers death, the two cases would likely be considered
substantially related. Although the States focus on Stanleys marital status, rather than
parental fitness, in the younger childrens cases differed from its focus in Karen Stanleys
case, Stanleys lawyers still argued that a fitness hearing was required when they had repre-
sented an adverse party in a prior case that found him to be an unfit parent. The only exception
to the rule is when a former client gives informed consent. Id. There was no suggestion that
Karen Stanley gave such consent.
91 Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 11, at 10.
92 Joseph Sjostrom, Unwed Dad Loses Rights to Children, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 1973, at
A16, http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1973/09/14/page/36/article/display-ad-33-no-title
[http://perma.cc/88QE-8EBH].
93 See infra notes 23436.
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not always clear.94 Stanley argued that, as his childrens father, his marital status
should not justify their placement in the States custody and that juvenile court pro-
cedures did not give him a meaningful ability to reunify with his children.95 At trial,
his attorney argued that the absence of a legal marriage should not be a basis for
removing the children from Mr. Stanley and making them wards of the court since
he did build up a father[-child] relationship96suggesting a relationship right was
formed by Stanley raising his children, rather than depending on his biological
fatherhood. After the court declared the children dependent, Stanleys lawyers
shifted their focus to the difficulty Stanley would have in regaining custody. They
filed a motion to vacate because the trial courts order declaring the children depend-
ent effectively terminated all of [Stanleys] parental rights and he could never
remedy the basis of the finding.97 The States attorney had stated that Stanley could
seek custody at a future point, but any such request would be subject to the proba-
tion officers investigation and the courts decision.98 The probation officer made it
clear that she did not believe that Stanley was in a position financially to provide
properly for the children and that he would have to present a proper plan in the
best interest of the children for her to recommend that he obtain custody.99 Thus,
even without a finding of unfitness, she would have placed the burden on Stanley
to prove his financial ability to raise the children and subjected a future custody
decision to the best-interests standard. Challenging these rulings evoked due process
concernsthat as a biological father who had raised his children, the absence of a
marriage did not suffice to deprive Stanley of custody, and that, if he were deprived
of custody, he would be entitled to some meaningful opportunity to reunify with his
children. But neither at trial nor in the post-trial motions did the lawyers cite a
specific constitutional clause as authority for their argument.100
B. Stanleys Appeals and the Focus on Equal Protection, Not Due Process
Through his lawyer, Patrick Murphy, Stanley appealed the family courts decision
to the Illinois Supreme Court, and his argument on appeal cited the Equal Protection
Clause, but not the Due Process Clause.101 He argued that the Illinois statute classi-
fying all mothers and married fathers as legal parents presumptively entitled to
94 Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 11, at 1113.
95 Id.
96 Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 38, at 21.
97 Petition in Support of Motion to Vacate, supra note 56.
98 Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 38, at 10.
99 Id. at 11.
100 See id. at 910, 21; Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 11, at 1113; Petition in
Support of Motion to Vacate, supra note 56.
101 See Stanley v. Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ill. 1970), revd sub nom. Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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custody, while classifying unmarried fathers as not so entitled served no rational
purpose.102 He made no claim that sex discrimination entitled him to heightened
scrutiny.103 Although he discussed parental rights and criticized the absence of a clear
procedure for regaining custody, he made no explicit argument that the Due Process
Clause entitled him to a hearing on parental fitness or a particular procedure for ob-
taining custody.104 Choosing which arguments to raiseand not to raiseshaped
the Supreme Courts consideration of the case, significantly contributing to the voting
and issue fluidity that arose at the Court, as will be discussed in Part II.C and Part III.105
Murphys choice of which argument to raise, of course, came years before the
Supreme Court decided the case and was shaped by the precedents available at the
time. In a 2014 interview, Murphy said that he recalled no strategy in that choice.106
An evaluation of the available precedents at the time can, however, explain the strategic
options that were available. Both an Equal Protection and Due Process Clause focus
carried risks, as both involved then-unsettled and controversial elements of constitu-
tional family law.
The Equal Protection Clause allowed Murphy to challenge the disparate treatment
of unmarried menboth as compared to women (whether married or unmarried)
and to married menbecause only unmarried men could lose their children to foster
care without a showing of parental unfitness. And it allowed him to draw on the
Supreme Courts 1968 decision in Levy v. Louisiana,107 which held that a statute
denying illegitimate children the ability to sue for the wrongful death of their mother
violated the childrens equal protection rights108a holding that raised some question
about state classifications based on the marital status of a childs parents. But the
Supreme Court had historically applied deferential rational review to sex discrimina-
tion cases.109 An equal protection argument, therefore, risked deference to the long
legal history of assigning different legal statuses to the relationship between unwed
fathers and their children.110 Advocates had begun to seek heightened scrutiny for
sex discrimination cases, but the Court had not yet decided to apply such scrutiny.111
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 81516.
105 See infra Part II.C and Part III.
106 April 2014 Interview with Murphy, supra note 40.
107 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
108 Id. at 7072.
109 See, e.g.,Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 21721 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing
that historical precedent required gender classifications to be subjected to rational basis review);
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (applying rational basis review to a statute prohibiting
females from bartending without familial relation to a male bar owner), abrogated by Craig,
429 U.S. 190.
110 See generally MICHAELGROSSBERG,GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 196233 (1985) (discussing the legal history of the
status of illegitimate children).
111 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 7576 (1971); Brief for Appellant at 5, Reed, 404
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Such claims were just beginning to percolate at the time of Stanleys state court
appeal, and had just reached the Supreme Court at the same time as Stanley. The
first such claim to reach the Supreme Court, Reed v. Reed, was argued before the
Supreme Court on October 19, 1971, the same day Stanley was ultimately argued
before the Court.112 Ruth Bader Ginsburg represented Sally Reed, challenging a state
law that preferred men over women as executors of estates.113 Ginsburg explicitly
asked the Court to treat sex as a suspect classification and apply heightened scrutiny
in equal protection challenges to sex classifications.114 Her brief also argued that the
statute failed under rational basis review.115 At the time that Murphy had developed
his equal protection arguments in Stanley, there was no Supreme Court precedent
for heightened review. Efforts to establish heightened scrutiny were cutting edge,
as evidenced by Ginsburgs briefs greater reliance on academic and policy argu-
ments than Supreme Court precedent.116 Although Stanley presented the opportunity
to raise arguments similar to those that Ginsburg raised in Reed, it is unsurprising
that Murphy did not make similar arguments. Murphy was a crusading reformer of
juvenile courts handling of foster care and juvenile delinquency cases; sex discrimi-
nation was not his core issue.
If Murphys equal protection argument led to a deferential standard of review,
a due process argument would have brought different benefits and risks. Certainly,
he could have raised both claimsthe children in Levy had done so, for example.117
And the Supreme Court had ruled in the 1920s that the Due Process Clause protected
parents rights. Murphy could have cited Meyer v. Nebraska118 and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters119 for the proposition that the Due Process Clause protected Stanleys right
to bring up children.120 But reliance on these older cases carried risks. The Su-
preme Court decided them in the midst of the Lochner eras substantive economic
due process focus.121 Three decades after the New Deal repudiation of Lochner, it
was not clear whether the Court would be willing to entertain a substantive due
process argument or apply such older precedents with any force. In 1944, the Prince
U.S. 71 (No. 70-4), 1971 WL 133596 (arguing that sex is a suspect class which is due
heightened scrutiny).
112 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1971); Reed, 404 U.S. 71.
113 Reed, 404 U.S. at 71.
114 Brief for Appellant, supra note 111; see also supra notes 1459 and accompanying text.
115 Id. at 6067.
116 See id. at 1441.
117 See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (noting both Due Process and Equal
Protection Clause challenges to the statute at issue).
118 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding invalid a law that prohibited a teacher from teaching a
foreign language to children under the Due Process Clause).
119 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding invalid an education act that interfered with parents
right to direct the upbringing of their children).
120 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; see also Pierce, 268 U.S. at 53435 (recognizing parents
liberty . . . to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control).
121 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
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v. Massachusetts122 Court had recognized some constitutional protections for fami-
liesat least when those rights were bolstered by the First Amendments Free Exer-
cise Clausebut still upheld state intervention to protect children while applying
fairly deferential review.123 The Supreme Court had never even addressed a case in
which a state child welfare agency sought to remove a child from a parents custody.
For decades, such cases had occurred without meaningful constitutional oversight,
and it was by no means certain that the Supreme Court would impose it. It was not
clear whether the Court would want to analyze the child welfare system on due
process grounds or, if it did so, whether the Court would defer to state action as in
Prince or apply a more muscular review. Indeed, as the State pointed out to the
Stanley Court, there was a split in authority whether the best interest of the child
standard or something more deferential to parents rights applied to child protection
cases.124 Presenting that issue squarely to the Court risked the Court ruling that the
Constitution provided little protection to any parents.
A due process argument could have drawn analogies to contemporary efforts to
reform juvenile delinquency cases. The first juvenile court was established in
Chicago in 1899, and that court had intentionally handled juvenile delinquency and
child welfare cases with great informality, on the theory that well-intentioned judicial
intervention could improve troubled childrens lives.125 For more than half a century,
juvenile courts handled both child welfare and juvenile delinquency cases with little
constitutional oversight. That view was increasingly criticized, leading the Supreme
Court in In re Gault126 in 1967 to use the Due Process Clause to impose basic pro-
tectionsconstitutional domesticationon juvenile courts delinquency cases.127
Juvenile delinquency cases had strong analogies to criminal proceedings and the
various rights of criminal defendants, but the Court nonetheless rested its holding
on the Due Process Clause rather than the individual criminal procedure amend-
ments.128 How the Due Process Clause might apply to juvenile courts child welfare
dockets was an open question. Stanley presented the opportunity to raise at least
122 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
123 See id. Prince involved a child and her aunt, who wished to circulate religious tracts
on a street corner at night in violation of state child labor laws. Id. at 15962. In addition to
Prince, the Court had also described parents, or at least mothers, rights to custody as far
more precious . . . than property rights. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953). This
language, however, was dicta in a case that involved the enforcement of an ex parte private
custody order across state lines, rather than a child protection case. Id.
124 Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 20 n.15 (The question of the circumstances
under which the state can remove the control of children from the custody of legal parents
has been the source of ultimate confusion.).
125 Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109 (1909) ([T]he form
of procedure is totally different [in juvenile court] and wisely so.).
126 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
127 Id. at 22 (holding the requirements of due process apply to juvenile delinquency
proceedings).
128 See id. at 3134, 5758.
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some due process concernsthe trial involved a juvenile court that thought it could
take children out of a parents custody without proving the parent unfit, offering a clear
path toward reunification, or providing a parent an attorney, even when he explicitly
requested one.129 By crafting an equal protection argument, rather than a due process
argument as in Gault, Murphy took aim at the statute, not juvenile court procedure.
Murphys arguments did not fare well at the Illinois Supreme Court, which re-
jected his appeal in a two-page opinion.130 As that court summarized, Stanley
urges . . . that an unconstitutional distinction inheres in the favorable classification
of unwed mothers as parents, as opposed to the exclusion of unwed fathers from that
classification.131 The court rejected this argument because, in its view, a rational
relationship existed between the juvenile courts purposes and the challenged sex
classification.132 The court, however, did not explain what that rational relationship
was, suggesting that the deferential standard of review did much of the courts work.133
There was no discussion of whether such rational review as applied sufficed for a
sex discrimination case because Murphy made no claim that heightened scrutiny
applied.134 The court seemed unhappy with the clarity of Murphys argument, writing
that he apparently made a procedural argument regarding Stanleys difficulty in
regaining custody,135 which the court declined to address because he had not tried
to reestablish such rights.136 Neither Murphys argument nor the Illinois Supreme
Courts decision addressed whether the initial dependency finding and order, which
placed the children with the Ness family, comported with due process.
Murphy presented similar arguments to the U.S. Supreme Court. The question
presented was whether the Illinois statute denies surviving unwed natural fathers
the equal protection of the laws, and his brief conceded that this equal protection
question was the only issue raised in the Illinois Supreme Court.137 He made no
specific due process argument, which reduced the risk that the Supreme Court would
limit due process protections for parents and children in child welfare cases. Nor did
he ask for heightened scrutiny of the equal protection claim.138 Murphy also clouded
the categories that the statute created. They obviously discriminated on the basis of
sex, treating unwed mothers differently than unwed fathers. But Murphy lumped
129 Gault also held that the Due Process Clause guaranteed counsel to children in juvenile
delinquency cases. Id. at 41.
130 In re Stanley v. Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814 (Ill. 1970).
131 Id. at 815.
132 Id.
133 See id. at 816.
134 See id. at 81516.
135 See id. (If, as it appears, Stanley is arguing . . . .).
136 Id. at 816.
137 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 13, at 23.
138 Murphy made clear at oral argument that he assumed the equal protection standard was
whether the classification was reasonable and not arbitrary. Oral Argument, supra note 48,
at 3:00.
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such sex discrimination with other categories, specifically comparing wed but
widowed fathers with unwed fathers like Stanley.139 He thus implicitly questioned
a sex discrimination frame and any heightened scrutiny (explicit or implied) that
such a frame might trigger. Justice Brennan even sought to help Murphy frame it as
a case about discrimination between unwed mothers and unwed fathers at oral
argument, and Murphy responded with the allegedly broader argument that the
State also discriminated between unwed and wed fathers.140
Murphys approach only partly hid the due process issues that lurked within this
equal protection claim. The brief emphasized that Stanley had not neglected either
Peter Jr. or Kimberly141 and argued that Stanley had no meaningful ability to be
appointed custodian of his children.142 Moreover, it directly cited the Lochner-era
substantive due process parental rights cases.143 The brief argued, for pages, that
Stanleys biological and familial relationship with his children triggered consti-
tutional protection144a quintessential due process argument. And an amicus curiae
explicitly argued that Illinoiss statutory scheme violated due process.145
The States brief also revealed the due process implications of the case, and the
State explicitly argued against using the Due Process Clause to provide any signifi-
cant protection to parents.146 The State defended the sex-based classification, attack-
ing the general disinterest of unwed fathers in their children,147 but went much
further to diminish the right to family integrity generally. The State relied on Prince
for the proposition that the states reasonable attempts to secure the welfare of its
children trumped whatever rights parents might have in their children.148 This argu-
ment implies that due process rights to family integrity were a relic of the Lochner
era, significantly limited by Prince.149 As a result, unwed fathers were not the only
parents who could lose custody without being proven unfitthe State could do that
to any parent, even married parents, when the welfare of the child so requires.150
If the State of Illinois had its way, the best interests of the child standard would
govern all child protection cases.151
139 Id. at 9:12.
140 Id. at 14:27.
141 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 13, at 1112 & n.3.
142 Id. at 1315.
143 Id. at 16 (citing Pierce v. Socy of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
144 Id. at 1922.
145 Brief of Ctr. on Soc. Welfare Policy & Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant,
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (No. 70-5014), 1971 WL 126675.
146 Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 1822.
147 Id. at 8.
148 Id. at 20.
149 See id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
150 Id. at 2021.
151 Id. at 21 ([T]he only relevant consideration in determining the propriety of governmental
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II. THE SUPREME COURTS DECISION-MAKING IN STANLEY
When the case reached the Supreme Court, due process would finally have its
day. The Court ultimately ruled that as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was
entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from
him.152 This holding required recognizing the strong substantive due process right
of parents to the custody of their children, which the Court described as a right that
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection.153 That holding removed the cloud from Lochner-era precedents, which
had first recognized such rights and suggested that the Supreme Court would offer
stronger protection of these rights.154 Procedurally, only a hearing on fitnessand
not a presumption that unwed fathers were not fitcould suffice.155 The Illinois
statute also violated the Equal Protection Clause, but, as the Court noted, that ruling
follows from its due process decision.156
The Court reached this set of holdings circuitously. The storyrevealed through
original research into the Justices notes, memoranda to each other, memoranda from
clerks, and draft opinionsinvolves strategic behavior by the Justices, a Court strug-
gling to deal with due process and sex discrimination in a period of turnover and
possible ideological shift, and lawyers litigation choices that nearly doomed their
clients case.
The lawyers turned the case over to the Supreme Court Justices after oral argu-
ment on October 19, 1971. Between then and the Courts ultimate decision, the result
shifted from a 52 vote for the Statespecifically, to dismiss the certiorari petition
as improvidently granted (DIG) and leave the Illinois Supreme Court decision intact
to a 52 victory for Stanley.157 Only two JusticesByron White and Thurgood
Marshallvoted for Stanley throughout the Courts decision-making.158 But four
of the five Justices originally aligned with the State changed their views.159 By the
intervention in the raising of children is whether the best interests of the child are served by
such intervention.).
152 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
153 Id. at 651.
154 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 6465 (1905).
155 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 65258.
156 Id. at 658.
157 See infra Part II.BC.
158 Justice White, 1st Draft Opinion, Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (Nov. 8, 1971) (dis-
senting) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Letter from Justice Marshall to Justice
Brennan (Oct. 28, 1971), in THE BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE (Paul J.
Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II & Forrest Maltzman eds., 2011) [hereinafter Letter from
Marshall to Brennan], http://www.supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971
/70-5014.pdf [http://perma.cc/K48V-QR48] (dissenting from per curiam opinion).
159 See infra Part II.BC.
2016] STANLEY V. ILLINOISS UNTOLD STORY 793
time the opinion was released several months later, Justices William Douglas, William
Brennan, and Potter Stewart all changed their votes and joined Whites opinion.160
Justice Harry Blackmun flipped between both sides multiple times.161
The four Justices who changed their votes did so at different times and for dif-
ferent reasons. Brennan likely supported Stanley all along, but voted to dismiss the
writ at conference to avoid a harmful precedent if the Court ruled for the State on
the merits; thus, he switched his vote quickly when he recognized that a majority
existed to rule for Stanley. Douglas initially wrote an opinion that would have ruled
strongly for the State, describing Stanley and other unwed fathers as hit-and-run
drivers162 and dissenting from a DIG. Douglas changed his mind soon after White
and Marshall circulated their opinions, and then joined the majoritybut he insisted
that the Court rule on due process grounds.163 Stewart switched his vote just days
before the Court issued its final decision, long after the ultimate result was clear.164
Blackmun appeared torn at conference, yet stated his inclination to rule for the
State.165 He later switched his vote and joined Whites opinion, only to later switch
back and join Burgers dissent because he did not believe the Court should address due
process issues, not because he concluded that the state statute was ultimately just.166
These vote changes, and the competing views of Justices in what became the
majority, led directly to the Court adopting a strong due process holding. In particular,
Douglass insistence that he would vote for a due process ruling, but not an equal
protection ruling, led White to focus his draft opinion on due process.167 Marshalls
strongly worded draft concurrencewhich he ultimately did not fileled White to
significantly strengthen the holding.168
160 See infra Part II.BC.
161 See supra notes 2526 and accompanying text.
162 Justice Douglas, 2d Draft Opinion, supra note 18, at 4 (Most unwed fathers are not
present at their childrens births and like hit-and-run drivers are difficult to locate.).
163 See Letter from WHA to Douglas, supra note 19.
164 See Letter from Justice Stewart to Justice White (Mar. 30, 1972) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Letter from Stewart to White] (writing Justice White to join the majority
opinion).
165 See Justice Douglas, Conference Notes, supra note 25 (noting Justice Blackmuns
initial inclination to affirm state courts holding in favor of the State).
166 See Letter from Blackmun to Burger, supra note 25 (writing to join the Chief Justices
dissent).
167 See Letter from WHA to Douglas, supra note 19 (noting that Justice White retained
the due process holding to keep Justice Douglas on the opinion).
168 Compare Justice White, 2d Draft Opinion at 3, Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (Nov. 18,
1971) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), with Justice White, 4th Draft Opinion
at 4, Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (Feb. 3, 1972) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (adding sentence at the end of Part I stating the holding that Stanley had clearly been
denied due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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A. Conference
Seven Justices169 met for conference on October 22, 1971. Chief Justice Burger
began the conference by passingdeclining to share how he would vote.170 To his
colleagues displeasure, Burger frequently passed, thus delaying his vote until other
Justices positions were cleargiving him the option to vote with the majority and
thus to retain the opinion assignment and exercise control over the content of the
majority opinion.171 Burger passed significantly more frequently than any other
Justice.172 Burgers pass in Stanley seems plainly strategic, as he favored the State
on the merits. Justice Douglass conference notes summarize Burger as believing
that Stanley could obtain custody by adopting his children or establishing paternity
of them, suggesting that the Illinois statute minimally invaded Stanleys rights, pro-
viding him a meaningful opportunity to seek custody.173
Justice Douglas went next,174 and his position changed the dynamics of the
conference. Justice Douglas was perhaps the Courts most liberal member;175 a vic-
tory for Stanley would probably require votes from him and the Courts other two
169 The Justices were, in order of seniority, Chief Justice Warren Burger, Douglas, Brennan,
Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun. The Court had two vacancies at the time; President
Nixon appointed Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist to fill those vacancies in October
1971, and those Justices took their seats on January 7, 1972, but took no role in Stanley.
LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUNS SUPREME COURT
JOURNEY 8485 (1st ed. 2005).
170 Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes on Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (Oct. 22, 1971)
[hereinafter Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes] (on file with author) (CJ pass); Justice
Douglas, Conference Notes on Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (Oct. 22, 1971) [hereinafter
Justice Douglas, Conference Notes] (on file with author) (CJ . . . passes).
171 SAUL BRENNER &JOSEPH M. WHITMEYER,STRATEGY ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 54 (2009); see also BOB WOODWARD &SCOTT ARMSTRONG,THE BRETHREN: INSIDE
THE SUPREME COURT 174 (1979) (noting Justice Burgers unwillingness to commit himself
before he had figured out which side had a majority); Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck,
Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 581, 585 (1996) (describing Justice Burgers alleged vote switching to the majority in
order to control the opinion assignment).
172 Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 171, at 589 n.22 (Burger, more frequently than
any other justice, passed at conference.).
173 Justice Douglas, Conference Notes, supra note 170 (suggesting Stanley could accom-
plish the ends by (a) adopting (b) [unclear] parentage).
174 Supreme Court Justices discuss their views on cases at conference in order of seniority,
starting with the Chief Justice.
175 Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, for instance, rank Douglas as the single most liberal
Burger Court Justice on eight out of ten categories. JEFFREY A. SEGAL &HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 34243 (2002); see also id.
at 181 (When Justice Douglas resigned, . . . Ford had to replace the Courts most liberal
justice . . . .).
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liberals (Brennan and Marshall), plus one other Justice. Burger had made clear that
his sympathies were with the State.176 Blackmun, then new in his tenure, was pre-
sumed averse to expanding constitutional protections.177 Stewarts votes in prior cases
made him unlikely to support Stanley.178 Thus, when Douglas stated his inclination to
affirm the judgment for the Statebecause, according to his own notes, the statute was
a reasonable classification[:] he can adopt children179the likely result seemed clear.
Burger then interjected180 that he would dismiss the writ as improvidently
granted.181 That result was consistent with both his and Douglass stated viewsif
Stanley could somehow seek custody, the Court could wait until he did so to decide
which rights he might be entitled to.182 Burgers DIG suggestion, like his initial pass,
may also have had strategic goals. Knowing that Douglas was troubled by Stanleys
failure to file for custody of his children, Burger felt more comfortable that he could
command a majority to dismiss the writ. Burger frequently sought to avoid a decision
on a substantive legal issue by attempting to focus the conference on a procedural
mechanism to dispose of the casesuch as a DIG, or a dismissal on mootness,
standing, or some similar ground.183 The question remains, why would Burger settle
for a DIG, rather than a judgment for the State on the merits? Perhaps he wanted to
avoid a fight over the proper level of scrutiny to apply in a sex discrimination case,
176 See Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Justice White (Nov. 23, 1971), in THEBURGER
COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE (Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II & Forrest
Maltzman eds., 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Burger to White], http://www.supremecourt
opinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-5014.pdf [http://perma.cc/K48V-QR48] (stat-
ing it is clear Stanley failed to use state remedies available to him).
177 See GREENHOUSE, supra note 169, at 52 (explaining how Chief Justice Burger fully
expected Justice Blackmun to not expand constitutional protections).
178 Justice Stewart had dissented in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), which struck
down a statute denying illegitimate children the right to sue for damages for the wrongful
death of their mother. The dissent would have allowed states to define what family rela-
tionships are entitled to legal recognition, especially when they followed traditional rules
regarding parents marital status. Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins., 391 U.S. 73, 7778 (1968)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). The Glona dissent doubled as a dissent in Levy. See id.
179 Justice Douglas, Conference Notes, supra note 170; see also Justice Blackmun, Confer-
ence Notes on Stanleyv. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (Oct. 22, 1971) [hereinafter Justice Blackmun,
Conference Notes] (transcribed) (on file with author) (D . . . Hs access thru adoption.
This saves from unconst).
180 Justice Douglass Conference Notes summarize a statement from CJ (Chief Justice
Burger) and then from himself, followed by another entry from CJ. Justice Douglas,
Conference Notes, supra note 170.
181 Id.
182 See Chief Justice Burger, 2d Draft Opinion at 12, Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014
(Jan. 24, 1972) (dissenting) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Justice Douglas,
2d Draft Opinion, supra note 18, at 5.
183 Burger made such efforts in 18% of all cases in the 1983 term. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 91 (1998).
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which could have arisen if the Court reached a decision on the meritsa goal that
may have led him to support a per curiam opinion in a statutory sex discrimination
case decided the prior term.184 More immediately, the Court addressed Reed v. Reed,
which was argued the same day as Stanley and which included Ruth Bader Ginsburgs
request for heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications.185 Burger would avoid
addressing that issue in Reed by writing a unanimous opinion striking down the sex
classification under rational basis review.186 (A majority of the Court would not apply
heightened review until Craig v. Boren, which was decided in 1976.)187 Seeking to
avoid a fight over the level of scrutiny in Reedin which the question was squarely
presentedit would make sense for Burger to try to avoid it in Stanley as well.
Brennan went next, and then added to the weight against Stanley. Brennan
thought it was strange for an adult to assert an equal protection problem based on
different treatment of children,188 thus agreeing with a DIG.189 Though expressing
skepticism about the equal protection claim, Brennan notably did not say that he
would rule for the State. Instead he joined Burgers suggestion of issuing a DIG.190
His equal protection skepticism was curious because he had previously voted to strike
down a statute which prohibited illegitimate children from suing for the wrongful
death of their mother.191 As with Burger, scholars have documented Brennans use
of procedural arguments to prevent the Courts consideration of substantive issues
when he feared the Court would rule against his wishes.192 Brennan was skeptical
of sex-based legal classifications, and he could have feared that a majority of the
Court would create a harmful precedent for a future sex discrimination case and was
thus possibly attracted to a DIG as a means of avoiding such possibility.
After Brennans vote, Stewart explained that he also saw no invidious discrimi-
nation in the challenged statute193 and further expressed concern that Stanley had
184 Burger had maneuvered toward a per curiam decision in Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971). WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 171, at 123.
185 Brief for Appellant, supra note 111, at 1459.
186 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
187 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
188 Justice Douglas, Conference Notes, supra note 25; see also Justice Blackmun, Con-
ference Notes, supra note 179 (BrSee no = P prob).
189 Justice Douglas, Conference Notes, supra note 25.
190 Justice Brennan, 1st Draft Opinion at 2, Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (Oct. 28,
1971) (per curiam) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
191 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Perhaps Brennan initially saw a distinction be-
tween children raising an equal protection argument based on legitimacy classifications (as
in Levy) and a parent doing so (as in Stanley), but such a distinction was not articulated fully.
192 EPSTEIN &KNIGHT, supra note 183, at 92, 11920 (discussing Brennans use of issue
manipulation).
193 Justice Douglas, Conference Notes, supra note 25; Justice Blackmun, Conference
Notes, supra note 179.
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been found to have neglected his older daughter, Karen.194 There were now four
votesa majorityagainst Stanley.
White and Marshall then both stated their support for Stanley.195 Justice Blackmun
recorded their positions in sex discrimination equal protection termsWhite stated
that mo[ther and] fa[ther are] treated diff[erently] . . . invid[ious] discrim[ination]
and Marshall said that there is no good disti[nction] b[etween] mar[ried and] un-
mar[ried] fa[thers].196 Justice Douglas recorded Whites position in terms evoking
both due process and equal protectionan unmarried father should not have to
prove he is fit for the child[the] state cannot take child away from mother without
showing neglect.197
As the most junior Justice, Blackmun went last, and announced that he saw no
invidious discrimination; thus ruling for the State.198 He explained that he struggled
with the case, especially in light of the level of scrutiny question raised in Reed,
noting that if strict scrutiny applied to sex classifications, he would change his
mind.199 (Perhaps this level of scrutiny question was precisely the issue that Burger
sought to avoid by pushing a DIG, rather than a set of competing opinions on the
merits.) Blackmun had seen the case as a close one from the outset and dependent
on the level of scrutiny applied.200 In notes written three months before oral argu-
ment, he described Stanleys case as very appealing on its facts . . . if one is going
to be at all emotional, but that, under rational review, the differences between unwed
mothers and fathers justify Illinoiss statute.201 He noted then that strict scrutiny
would render the statute unconstitutional.202 As Linda Greenhouse has established,
Reed v. Reed had simultaneously forced Blackmun to wrestle with arguments in
favor of heightened scrutiny for sex classifications, and he was inclined to support
such scrutiny.203 Blackmuns struggle with the case and the absence of any resolu-
tion to the level of scrutiny question raised in Reed made dodging the issue through
a DIG an attractive option.
194 Justice Douglas, Conference Notes, supra note 25. Stewart had also grilled Patrick
Murphy on the trial court finding that Stanley had neglected his daughter Karen. Oral Argu-
ment, supra note 48, at 21:01.
195 See Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 179.
196 Id.
197 Justice Douglas, Conference Notes, supra note 25.
198 Id.
199 Id. Blackmuns handwritten notes state similarly: If our standard is one of rationality,
+ [affirm]. If      [our standard is one of] compelling state int, I am less sure. Justice
Blackmun, Conference Notes, supra note 179 (second alteration in original).
200 Memorandum from Justice Blackmun to himself at 2 on Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-
5014 (Aug. 17, 1971) (on file with author).
201 Id. at 12.
202 Id. at 2.
203 GREENHOUSE, supra note 169, at 210 (noting Blackmuns internal memorandum shows
a judge wrestling with whether gender is a suspect class).
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At the end of the conference, a majority of fourBurger, Brennan, Stewart, and
Blackmunvoted to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.204 Douglas dissented
because he would have ruled for the State on the merits, and White and Marshall
dissented because they would have ruled for Stanley on the merits.205 This decision
would have amounted to a complete loss for Stanleythe underlying order declar-
ing his children dependent would remain in effect and their case would proceed
toward adoption.206
B. Three Vote Switches and Douglass Insistence Led to a Weak Due Process Draft
This 52 vote for the State would quickly become a 52 vote for Stanleythough
not the same 52 alignment of the final decision. Through this vote switching and,
in particular, through Justice Douglass rationale for his vote switch, this equal pro-
tection case became a due process one.
Less than a week after the conference, Brennan circulated a per curiam opinion dis-
missing the writ as improvidently granted because the Court lacked a fuller state
court definition of the rights of an unwed father to the control and custody of his ille-
gitimate minor children.207 That same day, Marshall announced that he would circulate
a dissent.208 Blackmun issued the first memo suggesting that the conference votes
may switch, joining the per curiam [s]ubject to what Thurgood may have to say.209
Douglas drafted the first dissent from the DIG, arguing that the Court should
reach the merits and rule for the State because its statutory scheme served the
compelling and countervailing justification [of] the well-being of . . . illegitimate
children, a goal which justified infringing on the admittedly fundamental right of
family relationships.210 Douglas would not have ruled that the State could intervene
in families anytime it served childrens interests, but did initially support the stat-
utes denial of parental rights to unwed fathers.211 Unwed fathers were not a suspect
204 Justice Douglas, Conference Notes, supra note 25.
205 Id.
206 The State reported in its merits brief that it had filed a motion for appointment of a
guardian with power to consent to an adoption, which the juvenile court was holding in
abeyance pending resolution of the case by the Supreme Court. Brief for Respondent, supra
note 12, at 6 n.6. Dismissing the writ would have left the Illinois Supreme Courts ruling for
the State intact, which likelywould have led the juvenile court to adjudicate theadoptionmotion.
207 Justice Brennan, 1st Draft Opinion, supra note 190, at 12.
208 Letter from Marshall to Brennan, supra note 158.
209 Letter from Justice Blackmun to Justice Brennan (Nov. 2, 1971), in THEBURGER COURT
OPINION WRITING DATABASE (Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II & Forrest Maltzman
eds., 2011), http:/www.supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-5014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/K48V-QR48].
210 Justice Douglas, 2d Draft Opinion, supra note 18, at 3.
211 Id. at 4.
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class, he wrote, because they have control over initiating or continuing their mem-
bership therein.212 He assumed, therefore, that the decision not to marry was unilater-
ally mens and that Peter could have married Joan at any time.213 Stanleys counsel,
Patrick Murphy, had contested this point at oral argument in response to a question
from Justice Stewart: [I]f we assume this, we are assuming that all women are weak,
frivolous creatures, that any man has to say please marry me and she will. There is
no evidence that it was not Joan Stanley that would not marry Peter Stanley.214 (The
assumption that marriage was completely up to men and not women was disproven
in a 2013 Supreme Court family law case.215) Douglass first opinion thus assumed
that mothers necessarily wanted to marry the fathers of their children and would do
so, but for the fathers intransigencea view rooted in stereotypes of both women
and men.216 Douglas made his prejudice even plainer, comparing unwed fathers to hit-
and-run drivers, for whom granting rights would only interfere with swift and certain
placement in adopting homes.217 Douglas went on to suggest that unwed fathers
would only assert parental rights to obtain public benefits and cited an anthropologi-
cal work to suggest that women are inherently stronger parents.218
White circulated a draft dissent four days later.219 His opinionespecially in
comparison with the final decisionoffered only modest support for parental rights.220
It criticized the statute for permitting the removal of Stanleys children without any
212 Id. at 3 n.2.
213 Id.
214 Oral Argument, supra note 48, at58:44.Follow-up questions fromStewart and Blackmun
suggest some continuing doubt that women would turn down marriage in situations like the
Stanleys. Id. at 59:19. Murphys response came off as a humorous play on womens sup-
posedly inexplicable actions, which undermined his argument about sex stereotypes:
Justice Stewart: He would have been a fairly eligible suitor after
that history, wouldnt he? [Laughter]
Mr. Murphy: I am a bachelor, I dont know, but they tell me the
longer you live with a person, you might be less eligible.
Justice Blackmun: Mr. Murphy, what could she possibly gain by
not marrying him under these circumstances?
Mr. Murphy: Your Honor, as I say, what makes a woman do what
she does is beyond my comprehension very often, and I simply dont
know why a woman might not marry a man. [Laughter]
Id.
215 In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, a child was conceived by an engaged couple at the
time of conception. 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2561 (2013). The father also sought to marry the mother
earlier than planned, but the mother broke off the engagement. Id. at 2558.
216 Justice Douglas, 2d Draft Opinion, supra note 18, at 3 n.2.
217 Id. at 4. This was perhaps the first reference to how Stanley could impact private
adoptions.
218 Id. at 4 n.4 (citing MARGARET MEAD, MALE AND FEMALE 191 (1950)).
219 Justice White, 1st Draft Opinion, supra note 158.
220 Id. at 7 n.5 (Only by supposing . . . Stanley as having no cognizable interest in . . . his
children can I comprehend . . . the form of proof by which Stanley was deprived.).
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consideration of parental fitness,221 but White did not articulate how fitness should
have been considered. White left open the possibility that the State might not even
bear the burden of proving an unwed father unfit or neglectful, and could simply
provide the father some opportunity . . . to demonstrate that he has not been a neglect-
ful parent.222 Even this modest standard might be too much to impose on the State;
White wrote in a footnote that the State need do no more than hold an individual-
ized hearing into each childs welfare223a less rigorous standard than fitness.
Ironically, Whites draft thus seemed to adopt the States position that a best-interest
standard sufficed to protect any constitutional right to family integrity.224
Whites draft dissent discussed due process and equal protection issues simulta-
neously.225 He framed the core issues in equal protection terms, beginning and ending
his argument section with references to unequal treatment of different groups, yet
he spent much of the relevant section criticizing the procedures that Illinois provided
for Stanley to regain custody.226 White made his due process concerns clear, arguing
that Illinoiss procedure by presumption threatens to circumvent the constitutional
guarantee of due process.227 White reframed this concern in equal protection terms,
arguing that differences between men and women do not justify dispensing with
the need for particularized proof in confronting some respondents but not others.228
Whites dissent convinced Douglas; two days after White circulated his dissent,
Douglas sent a memo to the conference, which announced that he was changing his
vote and substituting a new one-page opinion dissenting from the DIG and arguing
that Stanley should have won.229 Douglas captioned his new opinion a dissent, sug-
gesting he still presumed the Court would vote to dismiss the writ, with he, Marshall,
and White dissenting.230
Crucially, Douglass new opinion focused entirely on procedural due processhe
faulted the Illinois proceedings for not permitting Stanley to either show that he was a
fit parent or disprove the inference of unfitness that came from his unwed parent-
hood.231 This reasoning did not go nearly as far as the final decision wouldit
221 Id. at 56.
222 Id. at 7.
223 Id. at 8 n.6.
224 See supra notes 14651 and accompanying text.
225 Justice White, 1st Draft Opinion, supra note 158, at 58.
226 Id. at 1 (comparing statutes treatment of unwed fathers to that of married fathers and
motherseven if unwed); id. at 4 ([T]o give an unwed father only custody and control
while an unwed mother or a married father retained the rights of natural parenthood, would
still be to leave the unwed father prejudiced by reason of his status.).
227 Id. at 5.
228 Id. at 9.
229 Memorandum from Justice Douglas to the Conference on Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-
5014 (Nov. 10, 1971) (on file with author).
230 Justice Douglas, 1st Draft Opinion, Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (Nov. 10, 1971) (dis-
senting) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
231 Id. at 1.
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suggested that an unwed father, even one who raised his children, could bear the
burden of proving his fitness, rather than placing the burden on the State to do so,
and that the State could demand much more of unwed fathers than other parents
solely based on their sex and marital status.232 Douglass opinion was pointedly
silent on the equal protection argument stressed by Stanley.233
One reason for Douglass narrow analysis may have been his discomfort with
Stanleys neglect of his daughter Karen. Where White antiseptically suggested that
it was possible that Stanley was an unfit parent, Douglas noted internally, Indeed
we are advised that he has been sleeping with his oldest daughter.234 White was
plainly aware of Douglass concern, and, when circulating a revised version of his
opinion, included a handwritten note distinguishing that concern from the issue
presented by the younger childrens case.235 Intriguingly, Whites note suggests that
he misunderstood the facts. His note reads, Dear Bill, You just think it was his
eldest daughter. He may however have older ones and this one may not be his.
BW.236 The record makes clear that Karen Stanley was Peter Stanleys daughter,
and Patrick Murphy conceded at oral argument that Stanley had neglected Karen.237
It is not clear what impact, if any, Whites confusion had on his or Douglass view
of the case.
Brennan would change the result before the day was out. Brennan circulated a
memo confirming that he would change his votewithdrawing his vote to DIG and
voting to reverse the Illinois Supreme Court, making a four-justice majority for
Stanley.238 Perhaps Whites opinion convinced Brennan as it did Douglas. But
Brennans prompt vote changejust two days after Justice White circulated his then-
draft dissent, and the same day that Justice Douglas announced his vote change
suggests that his original vote to DIG was strategic. That is, Brennan was likely
232 Id. at 3.
233 See generally id. (choosing to undergo a due process analysis, rather than equal
protection).
234 Handwritten Notes from Justice Douglas to Justice White on Justice White, 4th Draft
Opinion, Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (recirculated Feb. 3, 1972) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author). It is not clear where Douglas heard the allegation of sexual abuse. As noted
above, supra note 58, the record reflected that Stanley had been found to have neglected his
eldest daughter. Neither the States nor Stanleys briefs suggested sexual abuse occurred.
235 Handwritten Note from Justice White to Justice Douglas on Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-
5014 (Feb. 3, 1972) (recirculated unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
236 Id. Whites draft also noted that, even though Stanley had three children, the case
before the Court only involved twothat is, Karens case was not before the Court. Justice
White, 4th Draft Opinion, supra note 168, at 1.
237 Oral Argument, supra note 48, at 21:15.
238 MemorandumfromJustice Brennan to the Conference on Stanleyv. Illinois, No. 70-5014
(Nov. 10, 1971), in THEBURGERCOURTOPINIONWRITINGDATABASE(Paul J. Wahlbeck, James
F. Spriggs, II & Forrest Maltzman eds., 2011), http://www.supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu
/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-5014.pdf [http://perma.cc/K48V-QR48].
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sympathetic to Stanleys argument from the outset, but, after Douglas voiced his
position for the State at the conference, Brennan saw a majority for the State. When
Burger suggested a DIG, Brennan chose to vote for a DIG at the conference to avoid
a decision on the merits that would form binding precedent against Brennans pre-
ferred outcome. Brennan then took advantage of Douglass vote switch to quickly
change his own vote and form a majority for his preferred outcome.239
With a new majority in hand, White circulated a draft majority opinion.240 Most
importantly, in a nod to Douglas, he made the due process holdings explicit and em-
phasized the fundamental narrowness of his due process holding.241 He insisted that
courts give some focus to the strength and quality of the family bond before severing
it.242 But he emphasized that the court need do no more than hold a hearing on a
childs welfarebringing this language into the body of the opinion243 (it had been a
footnote in his draft dissent).244 White further explained that the Constitution required
states to exercise only minimal care before removing a child.245 With such language,
Stanley would have been a far less dramatic decisionso long as automatic separa-
tion was not required, minimal protections would pass Whites constitutional test.246
Blackmun padded the new majority for Stanley one week later, announcing that
he too was changing his vote and would probably join Whites opinion (though his
use of the word probably suggested his continued struggle with the case).247 He
apparently moved further toward Whites position overnight, joining Whites
opinion the next day.248
C. Marshalls Threatened Concurrence Strengthened the Due Process Holding
and Led to Two More Vote Switches
A 52 majority now existed for StanleyDouglas, Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun supporting Stanley, and Burger and Stewart (who had remained silent
since conference) for the State. But the new majority did not reach their result in the
same way, leaving White with the task of writing an opinion that ruled for Stanley,
239 Id.
240 Justice White, 2d Draft Opinion, supra note 168.
241 Id. at 5.
242 Id. at 6.
243 Id. at 7.
244 Justice White, 1st Draft Opinion, supra note 158, at 78 n.6.
245 Justice White, 2d Draft Opinion, supra note 168, at 7.
246 Id.
247 Letter from Justice Blackmun to Justice White (Nov. 18, 1971), in THEBURGERCOURT
OPINION WRITING DATABASE (Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II & Forrest Maltzman
eds., 2011), http://www.supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-5014
.pdf [http://perma.cc/K48V-QR48].
248 Letter from Blackmun to White, supra note 25.
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while keeping the support of the other Justices in the majority. That effort required
both the opinions ultimate due process focus and stronger protections for parents.
White faced competing pressures in keeping his majority coalition together.
Douglas had joined the due process sections of Whites opinion, but not the part
addressing equal protection.249 These sections went further than Douglass one-page
draft opinion of November 10, 1971while Douglas would have only required that
states provide unwed fathers an opportunity to rebut a presumption of unfitness,
Whites opinion made clear that unwed fathers (at least unwed fathers like Stanley
who raised their children) enjoyed a presumption of fitness.250
Although Douglas had joined an opinion, going further than he would have
initially gone, Marshall wanted the opinion to go further still. Marshall circulated
a draft concurrence that focused strongly on parental fitness and insisted that Stanley
enjoy the same protections that other parents did.251 Marshall began by recognizing
the strong presumption in favor of natural parents in Illinois laws, a presumption
consistent with the Courts recognition of family integrity as a fundamental right.252
He agreed with White and Douglas that the Illinois statute failed to provide Stanley
an adequate means to regain custody.253 The crux of the problem that Marshall saw,
however, lay earlier in the procedurethat Illinois took children into foster care
without any determination that their father is unwilling, unable, or unfit to assume
the parental role.254
Marshalls first sentence framed the case in equal protection terms.255 This
perhaps reflected a doubt that was articulated by his clerk in an internal memo:
whether the Court really means to resurrect substantive due process to decide this
case.256 Yet, Marshalls opinion could not avoid the cases due process overtones
citing, for instance, the Lochner-era due process family integrity cases for the
proposition that the Court has long recognized that the interest of a parent in the
family relationship is a fundamental one.257
249 Letter from Justice Douglas to Justice White (Nov. 18, 1971), in THE BURGER COURT
OPINION WRITING DATABASE (Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II & Forrest Maltzman
eds., 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Douglas to White], http://www.supremecourtopinions
.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-5014.pdf [http://perma.cc/K48V-QR48] ([P]lease
note that I join Parts I and II of your opinion of this date.).
250 Justice Douglas, 1st Draft Opinion, supra note 230, at 5; Justice White, 2d Draft
Opinion, supra note 168.
251 Justice Marshall, 1st Draft Opinion, supra note 22.
252 Id. at 3.
253 Id. at 12.
254 Id. at 3.
255 Id. at 1.
256 Letter from Justice Marshall Clerk to Justice Marshall (Nov. 22, 1971) (on file with
author).
257 Justice Marshall, 1st Draft Opinion, supra note 22, at 3.
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Marshalls draft differed from Whites in another way: while Whites draft con-
ceded that most unwed fathers were unfit or uninterested in parenthood,258 Marshall
specifically challenged derogatory stereotypes of unwed fathers, especially those
who were poor.259 He did so by explaining various reasons poor parents, in particu-
lar, may not marry:
[The states] judgment about a class of parents suffers from the
deficiencies of any stereotype. There are many reasons for ille-
gitimacy in our society, and not all of them compel the inference
that the father is unwilling or unable to care for his illegitimate
children. For example, commentators have suggested that illegit-
imacy among poor people may be encouraged by the structure of
state and federal welfare programs. Because many States provide
financial assistance only to children in one-parent households,
a father might decline to marry the mother of his children in order
to maximize the familys eligibility for financial assistance.260
Marshalls opinion did not mention race explicitly,261 and, indeed, Peter Stanleys
race was never mentioned in court documents.262 (According to his lawyer, he was
white.)263 Yet, it is not hard to see how concerns about race informed Marshalls
perspective. In 1971 (as today), rates of unwed parenthood among blacks were higher
than among whites, and this phenomenon received significant, and usually critical,
attention.264 In that context, one might reasonably hear a racial tinge in a blanket
criticism of unwed fathersand hear a pointed response in Marshalls draft.265
Marshalls discussion of why some parents do not marry was also notable for what
it lacked: there was no thorough discussion of the sex stereotypes at issue.266 He did
not challenge the idea that women like Joan Stanley were waiting passively to be
258 Justice White, 2d Draft Opinion, supra note 168, at 7 n.5.
259 Justice Marshall, 1st Draft Opinion, supra note 22, at 56.
260 Id. at 5.
261 See Justice Marshall, 1st Draft Opinion, supra note 22.
262 See Transcript of Record, supra note 65; see also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note
13; Brief for Respondent, supra note 12.
263 April 2014 Interview with Murphy, supra note 40.
264 For instance, several years earlier, Daniel Patrick Moynihan identified and wrote about
the relative lack of black nuclear families as a core cause of black poverty. U.S. DEPT OF
LABOR, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR
NATIONAL ACTION (1965).
265 In more recent times, scholars have pointed out that unwed black fathers are more
involved than the [unwed] white fathers are with their children, especially when the kids are
younger. KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN
THE INNER CITY 215 (2013).
266 See generally Justice Marshall, 1st Draft Opinion, supra note 22.
2016] STANLEY V. ILLINOISS UNTOLD STORY 805
married by men like Peter Stanley, and he did not take up Murphys argument that
marriage was a two-way street.267
Finally, Marshall made clear that the case centered on the power of the State to
break up families, not disputes between parents.268 This state power to intervene in
fundamental constitutional rights necessitated strong due process protections.
Marshalls opinion plainly sought a stronger ruling than Whites or Douglass
drafts would provide,269 yet Marshall had limited leverage. Votes flowed toward
Stanleys side, but could flow back, especially considering both how narrowly Douglas
described the due process issues at stake270 and the perception of Blackmun as a
generally conservative Justice not enamored with broad Due Process Clause holdings.
If Marshall would not join White, the most that would happen was a split opinion.
Marshalls chambers seemed aware of this dynamic; his clerk wrote in a November 22,
1971, memo to Marshall that she did not share her full concerns with Whites draft
because [she] did not want to undermine the drift on the Court to the right result.271
Indeed, Burger, who now found himself in the minority, pushed back against the
Courts drift toward Stanley. In a memo announcing that he would dissent from the
Courts judgment for Stanley, he wrote, This is really a ridiculous case to be ab-
sorbing our time and, paradoxically, I will spend a little more time trying to demon-
strate that.272 Burger wrote that his gravest question related to how the Court
could even address the due process issues that formed the basis of both Whites and
Marshalls opinions when Stanleys lawyers did not explicitly raise them.273 White
promised to consider this concern in his next draft.274
Burger also found an opportunity to land a rhetorical punch at Douglas; when
he circulated his draft dissent, he sarcastically noted: My thanks to Mr. Justice Douglas
for my unacknowledged plagiarizing of portions of the excellent opinion he wrote.275
267 See generally id.
268 Id. at 7 n.12 (This case does not present the question whether the father and the
mother are entitled to equal rights in a custody contest between them, and we intimate no
views on that question, which may involve considerations quite different from those pre-
sented by this case.).
269 See id. at 6. This motive was also stated by Marshalls clerk, Barbara Underwood, in
a memo to Marshall, in which she worried that, under Whites opinion, the state could
continue to discriminate against an illegitimate father, so long as he gets his pretermination
hearing. Letter from Justice Marshall Clerk to Justice Marshall, supra note 256, at 2.
270 Justice Douglas, 1st Draft Opinion, supra note 230.
271 Letter from Justice Marshall Clerk to Justice Marshall, supra note 256, at 1.
272 Letter from Burger to White, supra note 176.
273 Chief Justice Burger, 1st Draft Opinion at 6, Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (Dec. 2,
1971) (dissenting) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author ).
274 Memorandum from Justice White to the Conference, supra note 21.
275 Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to the Conference on Stanley v. Illinois, No.
70-5014 (Dec. 2, 1971), in THE BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE (Paul J.
Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II & Forrest Maltzman eds., 2011), http://www.supremecourt
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Burger referred to Douglass first draft opinion for the State that Douglas had quickly
disowned. Douglas and Burger did not get along well, with Douglas frequently
voicing his disrespect for Burger at the conference.276 Burger took the opportunity
from Douglass draft dissent and subsequent vote switch to return the favor.
White thus faced multiple pressures when revising his opinion: Burgers argu-
ment about the propriety of considering due process arguments at all;277 Douglass
insistence that the Court focus on a narrow portion of due process (and his unwill-
ingness to join an equal protection opinion);278 and Marshalls draft concurrence
espousing a stronger, fitness-based ruling for Stanley that also reached a strong
equal protection conclusion.279 If White failed to respond to Burgers concern about
addressing due process, he could lose votes, especially from those Justices initially
inclined to dismiss the writ. If White strayed too far from due process or endorsed
too strong of a due process provision, he would have risked losing Douglass and
possibly Blackmuns vote. If White did not give a strong enough ruling for Stanley,
he would have risked a separate opinion by Marshall, which could have reduced his
own opinion to a plurality.
The tentative vote was still 52, an important detail given other events in the
Court. White worked on his revision through January when William Rehnquist and
Lewis Powell took their seats on the bench.280 Burger suggested that all cases de-
cided 43 be reargued with Rehnquist and Powells participation.281 Stewart had not
yet revisited his position for the State at the conference, so Stanley avoided a dis-
cussion about reargument only because Blackmun had joined Whites opinion.282
Soon after White circulated his revised opinion on February 3, 1972,283 it was
clear that he succeeded in maintaining a winning coalition, but barely. Within days,
Douglas joined the due process sections of the opinion,284 Brennan joined the opinion
opinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-5014.pdf [http://perma.cc/K48V-QR48].
276 GREENHOUSE, supra note 169, at 59; see also WOODWARD &ARMSTRONG, supra note
171, at 85 (describing Burger and Douglas as stubborn and on a collision course in the
early 1970s).
277 Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to the Conference, supra note 275.
278 Letter from Douglas to White, supra note 249.
279 Scholars have identified draft concurrences, like Marshalls, as bargaining tools, in which
the concurrence author seeks to induce revisions in the majority draft. See, e.g., EPSTEIN &
KNIGHT, supra note 183, at 7677. If concurring separately would deprive the majority opinion
writer the opportunity to speak for a full Court, a possibly concurring Justice like Marshall
has some leverage.
280 Justice White, 4th Draft Opinion, supra note 168, at 11.
281 WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 171, at 176.
282 See Letter from Blackmun to White, supra note 25 (noting he would join Justice
Whites majority opinion).
283 Justice White, 4th Draft Opinion, supra note 168.
284 Letter from Justice Douglas to Justice White (Feb. 7, 1972), in THE BURGER COURT
OPINION WRITING DATABASE (Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II & Forrest Maltzman
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in its entirety,285 and Marshall withdrew his opinion and joined White.286 White had
held a four-Justice majority.
White focused his new draft on due process as a means of maintaining Douglass
support.287 One of Whites clerks made it known to one of Douglass that Whites
retention of the Due Process holding was aimed at keeping [Douglas] in his opinion.288
Douglass continued vote with White made clear that Whites strategy worked.
White also maintained an equal protection section, but it was a derivative of the due
process section. It began on page ten of an eleven-page draft, and simply held that,
following the due process analysis, depriving unwed fathers, but not unwed mothers
or wed fathers, of a hearing on fitness inescapably violates equal protection.289
White addressed the question of whether the due process argument was properly
presented to the Court in a footnote.290 He acknowledged at the outset of his draft
that Stanley pressed an equal protection argument only.291 Several pages later, he
inserted a footnote claiming that we dispose of the case on the constitutional premise
raised below, reaching the result by a method of analysis readily available to the
state court.292 This conclusion may have been fairas explained above, Stanleys
lawyers presented the due process concerns without using the phrase293but as-
serted in a rather conclusory manner.
Whites thin analysis regarding how the Court could address due process cost
Blackmuns vote. Blackmun joined Burgers dissent on March 13, 1972, explaining
that Whites footnote convinced him that the state courts should address the due
process question before the Supreme Court did.294 Blackmun wrote a longer memo
eds., 2011),http://www.supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-5014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/K48V-QR48] (noting he would join Parts I and II of Justice Whites opinion).
285 Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice White (Feb. 4, 1972), in THE BURGER COURT
OPINIONWRITINGDATABASE (Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II & Forrest Maltzman eds.,
2011),http://www.supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-5014.pdf [http://
perma.cc/K48V-QR48] (Your revision is completely persuasive . . . . I am happy to join.).
286 Letter from Justice Marshall to Justice White (Feb. 7, 1972), in THE BURGER COURT
OPINION WRITING DATABASE (Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II & Forrest Maltzman
eds., 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Marshall to White], http://www.supremecourtopinions
.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-5014.pdf [http://perma.cc/K48V-QR48] (I have
decided to withdraw my concurring opinion and to join your opinion . . . .).
287 Justice White, 4th Draft Opinion, supra note 168, at 6, 7, 10; Letter from Douglas to
White, supra note 249; Letter from WHA to Douglas, supra note 19, at 1 (noting that Justice
Whites retention of the due process holding was aimed at keeping [Douglas] in his opinion).
288 Letter from WHA to Douglas, supra note 19, at 1.
289 Justice White, 4th Draft Opinion, supra note 168, at 10.
290 Id. at 10 n.7.
291 Id. at 1.
292 Id. at 10 & n.7.
293 See supra notes 14144 and accompanying text.
294 Letter from Blackmun to White, supra note 26 (I fell off at footnote 9 and am now
not convinced that due process can be brought into the case.).
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to Burger explaining his change in position.295 He repeated that he saw Stanley as
a difficult case and criticized Whites footnote as a bootstrapping argument.296
In response to Marshalls draft concurrence, Whites new draft also suggested
stronger procedural rights for unwed fathers.297 Most importantly, White placed
parental fitness, and not childrens welfare, at the center of the case.298 White
strengthened that focus while keeping it under a due process headingthus simulta-
neously responding to both Marshall and Douglas.299 The core problem with the
Illinois statute, White now wrote, is that it made Stanleys actual fitness as a
father . . . irrelevant.300 The draft explicitly held that the Due Process Clause en-
titled Stanley to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken
from him.301 And White added language making clear that, given the strong constitu-
tional protections for family integrity, the majority saw no valid state interest in
separating children from fathers without a hearing designed to determine whether the
father is unfit.302 Whites revision also included paeans to due processrhetorical
flourishes in line with the stronger language of Marshalls draft.303
White did not explicitly write that the State bore the burden of proving an unwed
father unfit or that a parents marital status could not be considered as evidence of
unfitness.304 This muted language might have also been designed to keep Justice
Douglass supportespecially given Douglass November 1971 opinion on rela-
tively narrow due process grounds.305 Still, it is hard to see how Whites opinion
could mean that any proof insufficient to remove children from a mother or a wed
father could justify removing Stanleys childrenan understanding shared with
Douglas by his clerk.306 White noted that Illinois provided mothers and wed fathers
not only a hearing, but required proof of neglect before removing children;307
295 Letter from Blackmun to Burger, supra note 25, at 1.
296 Id. (noting that [d]ue process may lurk in the background of the case, but that the
State is entitled to the first crack at it).
297 Justice White, 4th Draft Opinion, supra note 168, at 10.
298 Id. at 4.
299 Id. at 4, 10.
300 Id. at 1.
301 Id. at 4.
302 Id. at 7.
303 For example, White wrote:
Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the
Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the
fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern
for efficiency and efficacy which may characterize praiseworthy gov-
ernment officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
Id. at 8.
304 See generally id.
305 See Justice Douglas, 1st Draft Opinion, supra note 230.
306 Letter from WHA to Douglas, supra note 19, at 1.
307 Justice White, 4th Draft Opinion, supra note 168, at 10.
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coupled with his equal protection ruling, it is hard to see how anything less would
be required for unwed fathers.
All of these changes were met with approval in Marshalls chambers. His clerk
described the great improvement in Whites draft, and advised Marshall that she
saw no compelling reason not to join Justice Whites opinion.308 Three days later,
Marshall did exactly that, and withdrew his draft concurrence.309
Finally, Justice Stewartwho had sent no memos indicating his position since he
had sided with the State at the conferencejoined Whites opinion on March 30,
1972, with a brief memorandum that did not explain his thinking.310 Stewarts
silence makes his thinking mysterious. Stewart was not a strong believer in unwed
fathers rights or parents rights more generally. Stewart had dissented in Levy v.
Louisiana, suggesting that he saw little problem in laws discriminating on the basis
of parents marital status.311 Stewarts later votes suggest that he continued to harbor
doubts regarding an unwed fathers rights specifically, and the right to family integ-
rity more broadly.312
Stewarts papers suggest that Whites care to keep his opinion narrow in at least
one respect convinced Stewart to join. In particular, White carefully avoided any
categorical rule about levels of scrutiny; Whites opinion did not hold Illinoiss
statute to strict scrutiny and avoided identifying a level of scrutiny altogether.
Stewarts papers suggest that he was attuned to this issue through the Courts
deliberation. When Douglas wrote in an early circulation that Illinois needed a
compelling and countervailing justification to interfere in Stanleys fundamental
rights to a family, Stewart underlined the language and wrote No in the margins.313
Stewart also wrote Thats right in the margins of a narrow due process point made
by Whitethat, even if Stanley could have obtained custody of his children, he
would still have an inferior status under Illinois law than any other parent.314 Stewart
seemed uneasy with Marshalls proposed opinion, writing that the assertion that
308 Letter from Justice Marshall Clerk to Justice Marshall (Feb. 4, 1972) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
309 Letter from Marshall to White, supra note 286.
310 Letter from Stewart to White, supra note 164 (stating only that he would be glad to
join [Whites] opinion).
311 391 U.S. 68, 7072 (1968) (holding that a statute denying illegitimate children the ability
to sue for wrongful death of their mother violated the childrens equal protection rights).
312 Stewart voted against unwed fathers rights in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394
(1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting), and against extended family rights in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 531 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting). He wrote the opinion finding no
constitutional right to counsel for parents in termination of parental rights cases. See Lassiter
v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
313 Justice Douglas, 2d Draft Opinion, supra note 18, at 3.
314 Handwritten Notes from Justice Stewart to Justice White on Justice White, 4th Draft
Opinion at 3, Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (recirculated Apr. 18, 1971) (unpublished man-
uscript) (on file with author).
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Illinois offered no fitness determination was not quite right, because Stanley could
have ask[ed] to get child.315 Stewart noted that two other sections of Marshalls
draft were too strong.316 When White circulated a near-final draft in March 1972,
Stewart also noted some of Whites language which narrowed the decisionunder-
lining the words and raised when reading Whites statement of the fundamental
right of a man in the children he has sired and raised.317
D. The Ambiguous Aftermath for Peter Stanley and His Two Younger Children
The Supreme Court announced its 52 decision for Stanley on April 3, 1972, but
Peter Stanleys Supreme Court victory did not lead to a swift reunification. Rather,
it led to extended wrangling in family court over his childrens future and still no
definitive resolution of his parental fitness.318
While his case was litigated in appellate courts, the case continued to develop
in juvenile court. First, the juvenile court continued to issue orders affecting Peter
Stanleys relationship with his two younger children.319 That court first deprived him
of any right to visit his children, and then ordered visits to resume while his state
appeal was pending.320 In the summer of 1970after the Illinois Supreme Court had
ruled against Stanleythe juvenile court again suspended visits.321 Such intermittent
visits likely did not set up Stanley and his children for a smooth reunification.
Second, Stanleys relationship with the Ness familywith whom he had entrusted
his children in late 1968 after Joans death and to whom the juvenile court origi-
nally granted custodydeteriorated.322 This dispute seems to have caused the
children to leave the Ness home, subsequently being shifted through five foster
homes in three years.323 Third, Peter Stanley had married, which led his lawyer,
315 Handwritten Notes from Justice Stewart to Justice Marshall on Justice Marshall, 1st
Draft Opinion at 3, Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (circulated Nov. 19, 1971) (concurring)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
316 Id. at 6. The first notation comes in the portion of Marshalls draft discussing why
some poor couples may not marry and arguing that the fact of illegitimacy provides no
support whatever for the inference that the father lacks concern for his children. Id. The
second came in reference to Marshalls statement that the Illinois statute imposes on those
[fit] fathers a deprivation of enormous magnitude. Id.
317 Justice White, 6th Draft Opinion at 5, Stanley v. Illinois, No. 70-5014 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
318 Frederic Soll, Father Has Hopes of Getting Kids Back, CHI.TRIB., Apr. 4, 1972, § 1, at 3,
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1972/04/04/page/3/article/display-ad-2-no-title
[http://perma.cc/YT37-J6CW] (noting that Stanley still had to go back to the Illinois Juvenile
Court to prove his fitness as a parent after the Supreme Court ruling).
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 6 n.6.
323 Soll, supra note 318, § 1, at 3.
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Patrick Murphy, to predict that the juvenile court would promptly reunify Stanley
with his children.324
But Murphys prediction was not prescient. The State refiled a petition alleging
that Stanley had neglected his two younger childrennotably, this was the same
allegation that the State had initially filed but then dropped so it could use Stanleys
unmarried status as grounds for placing his children in foster care.325 The case records
remain sealed, but the media reported that the juvenile court ordered Stanleys
children to remain in foster care pending litigation on these neglect allegations326
and then ruled Stanley unfit in September 1973.327
That ruling did not end the saga; Stanley retained a legal services lawyer to
appeal the unfitness finding and then, according to Murphy, the State dismissed the
case against Stanley and returned his children to him.328 A dismissal meant the trial
court fitness ruling would be neither upheld nor reversed on appeal and, if there was
unfitness, there was never a finding of whether Stanley had rehabilitated sufficiently
to regain custody. The publicly available record does not disclose why the State ulti-
mately relented. In the meantime, Karen Stanleythe older child whom a court
found had been neglected by Peter Stanleylived with her boyfriend and never
reunified with her father.329
Peter Stanleys legal case thus ended ambiguously. It remains difficult if not
impossible to know whether the State was right to seek custody of Stanleys two
younger children. If, indeed, Stanley was an unfit parent, the case might represent
an ultimate failure by the State to protect his children. By failing to even try to prove
the neglect that it initially alleged, the State rendered its efforts vulnerable to legal
attack and forced the children to live through years of uncertainty in multiple foster
homes, and then, for unclear reasons, the State abandoned its efforts, leaving the two
children to live with a questionable father from whom they had been separated for
324 Id. Murphy was quoted as saying, [C]onsidering the facts, and Stanleys new situ-
ation, I doubt that it can be proved he is an unfit parent. But I think the most important thing
in his favor is the mammoth desire Stanley has displayed in his attempt to regain his lost
children. Id.
325 JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 198 n.1 (3d ed. 1992) (quoting
Letter from Patrick T. Murphy (Mar. 23, 1976)).
326 Fathers Custody Fight Continues, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 1973, at A5, http://archives
.chicagotribune.com/1973/02/08/ [http://perma.cc/9T73-KS55].
327 Sjostrom, supra note 92. As the juvenile court records remained sealed on remand, the
precise basis for this finding cannot be corroborated. Local media reports suggested it was
informed by accusations that Peter Stanley had sexually abused his older daughter Karen. Id.
328 AREEN, supra note 325, at 198 n.1. The letter stated that at the time the letter was
written in 1976, the children had lived with Stanley for about a year, suggesting reuni-
fication occurred in 1975. More recently, Murphy recalled that Peter Stanley and his two
younger children reunified only after ongoing fights with the Illinois Department of Children
& Family Services (DCFS). April 2014 Interview with Murphy, supra note 40.
329 April 2014 Interview with Murphy, supra note 40.
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six years. If, despite whatever problems he had and whatever occurred between him
and his eldest daughter, Stanley remained a fit and committed father to his two
youngest children, then the States actions throughout the case spited its stated interest
in protecting Stanleys children. Whichever version is closer to the truth, it is dif-
ficult to see how the States actions served the long-term interests of either Peter Jr.
or Kimberly.
III. HOW STRATEGIC VOTING, JUSTICES STRUGGLES WITH DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION, AND LITIGATION ERRORS SHAPED STANLEY
Stanley illustrates the intersection of multiple phenomena typically discussed
separately in the Supreme Court decision-making literaturestrategic voting, voting
changes, and litigation errors leading to the Court substituting its own framing of the
issues for the litigants. The Courts deliberations also add depth to our understand-
ing of two crucial figures on the Supreme CourtWilliam Brennan and Harry
Blackmunand demonstrate how much of the modern constitutional law regarding
unwed fathers rights, and parents rights more generally, depends, in particular, on
Blackmuns evolution to a strong supporter of parents due process rights, which
began in Stanley.
In political science terms, Stanley provides insight into Supreme Court voting
and issue fluidity. Voting fluidity occurs when Justices change their votes between
their initial poll at conference and their final decision. Issue fluidity occurs when the
Court decides cases based on issues not presented by the parties. Both occur in a
minority of cases, and scholars have debated how much of this fluidity is explained
by Justices responding to preexisting law, Justices own ideological preferences, or
Justices acting strategically in pursuit of their policy preferences.330
Close study of individual cases and Justices can provide a richer understanding
of Supreme Court decision-making, especially of how voting and issue fluidity
intersect.331 The leading literature follows an empirical approach, studying Justices
votes and Court decisions in hundreds or thousands of cases.332 This approach is
330 See Jeffrey A. Segal, Whats Law Got to Do with It: Thoughts from the Realm of
Political Science, in WHATS LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO
IT, AND WHATS AT STAKE 17 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011) (noting that justices who
served on lower appellate courts are not more likely to abide by precedent, and are not less
likely to vote ideologically than are judges without appellate court experience). Over time,
scholars have come to agree that all factors help explain voting and issue fluidity, though
debates remain over each models relative contribution to explaining judicial behavior.
Charles Gardner Geyh, Introduction: So What Does Law Have to Do with It?, in WHATS
LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHATS AT STAKE,
supra, at 34 (noting that the influences on judicial decision-making are varied).
331 Cf. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 12930 (1998) (calling
both for more qualitative and quantitative research).
332 Cf. Robert E. Riggs, When Every Vote Counts: 54 Decisions in the United States
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immensely valuable and has allowed scholars to identify common factors correlated
with voting and issue fluidity. However, that aggregate perspective can mask more
nuanced factors that lead to voting and issue fluidity.333
Analyzing the decision-making in Stanley is particularly useful. A number of
cases have involved individual Justices changing their votes and thus the outcomes
of 54 cases, including high-profile cases such as National Federation of Independ-
ent Business v. Sebelius,334 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,335
and Bowers v. Hardwick.336 Other vote changes that did not affect outcomes are also
documented.337 These changes may speak volumes about the individual Justices who
changed their votes, but say less about the Courts inner workings other than the
basic rule that conference votes are tentative and the obvious note that 54 confer-
ence votes are more likely to change than less close votes. Most other cases involv-
ing vote changes did not flip case outcomes. Stanley, however, may represent the
most dramatic documented example of Supreme Court Justices changing their votes
and the outcome, and it illustrates the various strategic considerations that Justices
may have when they vote at conference and when they draft opinions.
Indeed, Stanley suggests several important contributions to this literatures
understanding of voting and issue fluidity. It identifies strategic behavior in confer-
ence votinga much-hypothesized, but little-documented phenomenon.338 It iden-
tifies strategic behavior during the opinion-drafting process, as various Justices
insist on particular rulings, threaten to concur separately, or raise concerns from a
dissenting perchall of which pressure an opinions author to accommodate his or
her colleagues concerns to maintain a majority through multiple drafts.339
Supreme Court, 190090, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 671, 703 (1993) (describing empirical
research providing modest insight into narrow slices of the subject).
333 See BAUM, supra note 331, at 12931.
334 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). Chief Justice John Roberts reportedly switched his vote. Jan
Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS (July 2, 2012,
9:43 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law/
[http://perma.cc/LU66-R6NL].
335 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Blackmun reportedly changed his vote, leading the Court to
rehear the case and changing the outcome from the result indicated by the initial conference
vote. GREENHOUSE, supra note 169, 14849.
336 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Justice
Lewis Powell changed his initial vote to strike down antisodomy laws to upholding them.
GREENHOUSE, supra note 169, at 15051.
337 For instance, Justice Clarence Thomas has discussed how the Justices voted unani-
mously at conference in one criminal case, but that he later changed his mind and drafted a
dissent, which three other Justices joined. Natl Constitution Ctr., The Supreme Court Re-
vealed, at 2:25-4:02, C-SPAN (Feb. 3, 2007), http://www.c-span.org/video/?c762945/clip
-supreme-court-revealed (interview of Justice Thomas).
338 See supra Part II.
339 White circulated seven drafts, above the Burger Courts average (which ranged from
2.6 to 5.2). Paul J. Wahlbeck et al., Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation
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Stanleys full story also explains how litigation choices can influence the issues
on which Justices decide cases. Although most political science literature describes
issue fluidity as a phenomenon that occurs between Justices as they build majority
coalitions,340 Stanleys litigation history demonstrates that issue fluidity can compen-
sate for arguments that lawyers failed to make. Issue fluidity is not merely the result
of internal Court dynamics.
Finally, Stanleys full story identifies the importance of Harry Blackmuns
evolution, in particular, to constitutional family law, and time stamps the beginning
of such evolution to an earlier date in his tenure than is commonly stated.
A. Stanleys Strategic Voting and Voting Fluidity
1. Stanley Involved an Unusually Large Amount of Voting Changes
The number and significance of voting changes in Stanley sets it apart. Voting
switches occur with modest frequencyin about 10% of Warren and Burger Court
cases341but voting switches that shift a cases outcome after conference are rare
only 1% of cases.342 Intuitively, conference majorities with more than a minimum
of votes (usually six or more) were far less likely to break up than minimum win-
ning coalitions.343 In light of this data, multiple Justices changing their minds and
flipping a 52 conference vote for one party to a 52 judgment for the other makes
Stanleys voting fluidity exceedingly rare.
Two factors separate from the specifics of Stanley may help explain this large
extent of voting fluidity. First, the Supreme Court decided Stanley in the midst of
significant turnover in its membership, which correlates with increased voting flu-
idity by all Justices. Hugo Black and John Harlan had recently left the Court (and died
in late 1971),344 and two new membersWilliam Rehnquist and Lewis Powell
joined the Court soon after oral argument in Stanley (and did not participate in the
on the United States Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 309 (1998). That relatively
high number of drafts is consistent with findings that more fragile majority coalitions lead
Justices to circulate more opinion drafts. Id. at 312.
340 See, e.g., id.
341 Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 171, at 581 n.1.
342 For instance, in cases decided between 1945 and 1958, 197 of 2,129 cases involved
individual Justices changing their votes, but only 22 cases in which vote changes shifted case
outcomes. Brenner, supra note 17, at 53031. Between 1956 and 1967, 791 vote switches
occurred, and this fluidity changed the outcome in only 85 cases. Saul Brenner, Fluidity on
the Supreme Court: 19561967, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 388, 388, 390 (1982). Similar results
were found for the Vinson Court. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 175, at 285.
343 Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Majority Opinion Assignments and the Maintenance
of the Original Coalition on the Warren Court, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 72, 77 (1988).
344 Black retired September 17, 1971, and Harlan retired September 23, 1971. ARTEMUS
WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 182 (2003).
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case).345 Blackmun was only in his second term on the bench,346 and Burger had only
become Chief Justice in 1969.347 New members appear to make continuing justices
more likely to reverse their positions on merits votes.348 This increased flexibility
may result from strategic considerations or exposure to new substantive views.349
The latter might be particularly apropos of the early Burger Court, which included
multiple Nixon appointees who sought to shift the Court away from what was per-
ceived as the Warren Courts excesses.350
Relatedly, scholars have identified a possible freshmen effectthat Justices
might be particularly likely to change their votes in their first several terms on the
Court as they acclimate to their new job.351 This view has been subject to some
debate.352 Whether a freshmen effect exists generally, it appears likely to have af-
fected Blackmun, who was in his second term on the Court when it decided Stanley.
Blackmun was described as paralyzed by indecision in his first terms on the
Court353 when he went through a particular evolution354 and was subject to intense
lobbying from his friend, Warren Burger, especially on due process cases.355
345 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 645 (1972) (noting that Justice Powell and Justice
Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case).
346 Peter Manus, The WhistlingThe Silence Just After: Evaluating the Environmental
Legacy of Justice Blackmun, 85 IOWA L. REV. 429, 434 (2000).
347 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 313 (1993).
348 Scott R. Meinke & Kevin M. Scott, Collegial Influence and Judicial Voting Change:
The Effect of Membership Change on U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 41 LAW & SOCY REV.
909, 911 (2007).
349 See id. at 91415 ([A] change in personnel can expose continuing justices to new
views and persuasive personalities. All of these long-term factors have the potential to bring
new information and social considerations into judges decisions, making membership
change lead to position shifts on specific cases as new collegial considerations make past
decisions less relevant as a guide to the current choice.).
350 DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE REHNQUIST COURT: UNDERSTANDING ITS IMPACT AND
LEGACY 14 (2007) (Rehnquist had railed against the excesses of the Warren Court
particularly in the criminal justice arena.).
351 See generally Saul Brenner, Look at Freshman Indecisiveness on the United States
Supreme Court, 16 POLITY 320 (1983).
352 See id. An early study asserted a three-year freshman effect. J. Woodford Howard, Jr.,
On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 62 AM.POL.SCI. REV. 43, 45 (1968). Another found such
an effect on the Burger Court. Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 171, at 589. But a more
recent study found no statistically significant effect. Timothy M. Hagle & Harold J. Spaeth,
Voting Fluidity and the Attitudinal Model of Supreme Court Decision Making, 44 W. POL.
Q. 119, 123 (1991).
353 WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 171, at 121 (noting that [t]he problem was
greatest on cases where his was the swing vote).
354 See infra Part III.C; see also Riggs, supra note 332, at 689 (As is well known,
[Blackmuns] ideological orientation was at first conservative but became more liberal as
years passed.).
355 Burger lobbied Blackmun and convinced him to agree to reargument of Eisenstadt v.
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2. Strategy and Ideology in Voting Fluidity
Far more was at work in Stanley than the Courts shifting composition. First,
Justices acted strategicallythey used a vote, a vote change, or the possibility of a
vote change to pull the Courts opinion closer to their preferred outcome. Some
behavior of this sort is common and well accepted such as when a Justice offers her
vote in exchange for a concession on one piece of an opinion.356 More controversial
strategies involve Justices voting contrary to their actual views in an attempt to shape
a decision less to their disliking.357 Such behavior has been criticized as cross[ing]
th[e] line between acceptable and unacceptable strategic behavior.358 Such behavior
has also avoided nearly as much focus in the judicial decision-making literature as
other forms of strategic behaviorperhaps because it has been difficult to document
many examples of this behavior.
Second, Justices ideology makes some of the voting fluidity predictable. The most
powerful explanations of voting fluidity relate to ideologyJustices change their
votes to conform with their principlesand the variables which correlate to fluidity in
the aggregate do not involve strategic behavior.359 The most frequent explanation of
voting changes that shift a cases result is that the marginal Justice in a 54 case is
ideologically closer to the dissenters than he is to any member of the original vote
coalition.360 Stanley involved more than one vote switch, and thus presented a more
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). GREENHOUSE, supra
note 169, at 87, 89.
356 See BAUM, supra note 331, at 106 (In particular, it is standard practice to modify the
language of opinions in an effort to win colleagues support.). It is also inherent in decision-
making on multi-judge courts, where . . . it is the norm for judges to sacrifice details of their
convictions in the service of producing an outcome and opinion attributable to the court.
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Colle-
gial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5253 (1993).
357 Id. at 52 ([S]trategic behavior refers to instances when an agent misrepresents her
preferences.).
358 Id. at 53 (A judge who disingenuously joins in an opinion dismissing a case on jus-
ticiability grounds in order to avoid an outcome on merits she regards as unjust, for example,
has crossed the line.).
359 See BRENNER & WHITMEYER, supra note 171, at 6364 (noting other non-strategic
reasons for voting fluidity). Forrest Maltzman and Paul Wahlbeck have demonstrated that
most voting changes better match Justices votes with their ideological views. Maltzman &
Wahlbeck, supra note 171, at 588. Maltzman and Wahlbeck term such behavior strategic,
but not in the sense used herethey describe vote changes to better match a Justices votes
and views, not a vote switch designed to affect the case outcome. Id. A study of conference
votes of the Burger Court found no aggregate evidence of an insincere votethat is, a vote
by a Justice for a position he did not believe in hopes of shaping the majority opinion. See
BRENNER & WHITMEYER, supra note 171, at 5657.
360 Hagle & Spaeth, supra note 352, at 121. Similarly, a study of Warren Court cases
whose results changed from conference to final vote found that the marginal Justicethe
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complicated dynamic. Still, consistent with these views, two of the vote changes ap-
pear to reflect Justices ideology. Two liberalsBrennan and Douglasshifted their
votes from the State to Stanley, joining the side that formed a better ideological
fit.361 There is little to explain Douglass shift besides a reevaluation of the merits
following Whites draft opinion.
But a compelling case exists that Brennan acted strategically in Stanley, voting
at conference against his actual wishes, and this represents a rare documented
example of such behavior. Such possibilities have been noted in the Supreme Court
decision-making literature, but rarely explored in depth.362 Why would this liberal
Justice who had voted for individuals against states in similar cases, before and after
Stanley,363 vote at conference for the State only to change his mind three weeks
later? The most likely explanation is that Brennans conference vote was damage
control. By the time it was Brennans turn to vote at the conference, it appeared
impossible for Stanley to win because Douglas had just announced his position in
favor of the State. Moreover, Burger had just suggested the possibility of dismissing
the writ as improvidently granted rather than rule for the State on the merits, making
clear that a nonsubstantive ruling for the State was possible. Brennan likely thought
that joining the majority could help ensure a dismissal of the writ as improvidently
granted rather than a decision for the State on the merits that would create negative
precedent in a later equal protection case. Such avoidance of a bad precedent is the
primary reason offered for a Justice voting contrary to her actual preferences.364
Such a strategic damage-control vote may be especially likely when a procedural
Justice most closely aligned with conference dissenterschanged his vote in 86% of these
cases. Saul Brenner, Timothy M. Hagle & Harold J. Spaeth, The Defection of the Marginal
Justice on the Warren Court, 42 W. POL. Q. 409, 409 (1989). Statistical analysis found that
the likelihood of a change was greater when the marginal Justice was ideologically closer
to the dissenters than to any member of the ODC [original deciding coalition]. Id. at 415.
Ideology held particularly strong predictive power for Justice Brennan, whose vote switches
most frequently led him to join his more liberal colleagues. Id. at 422.
361 For a statistical categorization of each Justices ideology, see SEGAL & SPAETH, supra
note 175, at 24849.
362 See, e.g., BAUM, supra note 331, at 106 (noting that strategic voting may be reflected in
the original conference vote but not exploring the frequency of or strategy in such voting).
363 Such support would have been consistent with Brennans vote that the State could not
discriminate against children on the basis of their parents marital status in Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968), and his later vote for the unwed father in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380 (1979), and for stronger due process protections for family integrity in Lassiter v. Dept
of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981), and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
364 Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 356, at 55 (noting that a judge may support an
outcome or rationale with which she disagrees . . . [to] prevent her courts adoption of some
other outcome or rationale that she thinks worse); see also Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and
Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2324 (1999) (de-
scribing such strategic voting as the most frequently hypothesized scenario of strategic voting).
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ruling is possible and the vote does not require an endorsement of the majority
position on the merits.365
Brennans strategic conference vote became voting fluidity366 when Douglas
changed his vote and Brennan could become the fourth and (on that seven-member
Court) decisive vote for Stanley. The timing of Brennans vote switchon the same
day that Douglas announced his vote switch, and just two days after White circu-
lated his opinionsuggests that strategic calculations motivated his conference vote.
The alternativethat in the course of forty-eight hours, Justice Whites draft con-
vinced both Douglas and Brennan to change positionsis possible but seems highly
coincidental given the relative rarity of Justices changing votes. Moreover, there is
already a record of Brennan making such strategic damage-control votes at confer-
ence. Brennan joined the majority in a criminal procedure case application so that
he could write the opinion himself. The case, Pennsylvania v. Muniz,367 addressed
whether police had to give criminal suspects Miranda warnings when asking routine
booking questions. The majority of the Court voted to create an exception to
Miranda v. Arizona368 for such questions.369 In a private letter to Marshall, Brennan
revealed that he actually opposed the exception, but voted for it because he made
the strategic judgment to . . . use [his] control over the opinion to define the excep-
tion as narrowly as possible.370
My argument that Brennans conference vote was strategic is not foolproof.
Brennan did articulate some uneasiness with Stanleys equal protection argument
at the conference. And though he was generally a strong supporter of due process
rights, including parental rights, he did vote for the State in one later unwed fathers
case,371 suggesting that he saw limits to the rights of unwed fathers. But Brennan
continued to articulate a commitment to due process protections even in that later
case,372 and was otherwise a reliable vote for parents rights.
365 See Caminker, supra note 364, at 2324 n.81.
366 Voting fluidity is a subset of such strategic votes; if no majority had become possible,
Brennan would not likely have changed his vote. Indeed, a successful damage control strategy
at conference will not lead to voting fluidity unless another Justice changes her votesug-
gesting that more instances of such voting may exist.
367 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
368 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
369 Muniz, 496 U.S. at 60205.
370 FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON
THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 3 (2000) (quoting Brennan 1990). The au-
thority to assign opinion-writing duties rests with the Chief Justice if he is in the majority or
the senior Justice in the majority. Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the majority when deciding
that a Miranda exception applied, but in the minority on another issue decided, thus leaving
Brennan with opinion-assignment authority.
371 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
372 Supreme Court papers show that Brennan saw Lehr as a close case. He passed when
discussing the case at conference. Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes on Lehr v. Robinson,
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3. Stewarts Complicated Conforming Vote Shift
Most Supreme Court vote changes occur when a Justice in the minority changes
his or her vote to conform to the majority view. Justices in the minority at confer-
ence are more likely to change their votesthey did so in 18.1% of cases, while
Justices in the initial majority did so only 4.6% of the time.373 Thus, when Justices
change their votes, they tend to increase the size of the final coalition rather than
to transform the conference majority into either a minority or a smaller majority.374
Empirical research suggests rather simply that conforming vote changes repre-
sent Justices going along with the crowd, especially when they care relatively little
about the case.375 In a study of cases decided from the 1946 through 1975 terms,
justices appear most likely to conform when the case is less salient and they are
opposed by a substantial majority on the other side.376 In these situations, perhaps,
drafting a dissenting opinion is simply not worth the effort when the Justice does not
care much about the case, or sees it as a close case,377 or even values consensus with
colleagues greater than his or her concerns about the particular case.378
The conforming label potentially masks more complicated dynamics at work in
Stewarts vote change, which has the functional hallmarks of a conforming vote
change.379 But this was not a simple choicehe could have easily joined Burgers
No. 81-1756 (Dec. 10, 1982) (on file with author). Before joining the majority opinion in
Lehr, Brennan circulated two memos requesting revisions designed to protect unwed fathers
rights in different factual circumstances. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Stevens
(June 1, 1983) (on file with author); Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Stevens (June 6,
1983) (on file with author).
373 See Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 171, at 587; see also Robert H. Dorff & Saul
Brenner, Conformity Voting on the United States Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 762, 764 (1992)
(Justices, therefore, are 12.1 times more likely to switch in the direction of conformity
(minority-majority) than in the direction of counterconformity (majority-minority).).
374 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 175, at 262.
375 Dorff & Brenner, supra note 373, at 773.
376 Id.
377 See Saul Brenner, Tony Caporale & Harold Winter, Fluidity and Coalition Sizes on the
Supreme Court, 36 JURIMETRICS 245, 253 (1996) (suggesting that avoid[ing] writing a
dissenting opinion may motivate conforming voting).
378 That description is perhaps particularly apt for lone dissenters at conference who
decide to join their colleagues to make a unanimous Court. A study of the Vinson Court
found a 36.8% probability of a lone dissenter switching votes, compared with only a 0.9%
probability of a member of a unanimous conference majority changing his vote. Id. at 248.
Similar results have been found in studies of different Court periods. Paul H. Edelman &
Suzanna Sherry, All or Nothing: Explaining the Size of Supreme Court Majorities, 78 N.C.
L. REV. 1225, 1226 (2000) (noting that studies show unanimous decisions and 54 split
decision are the most common while 81 decisions are the least common).
379 Stewarts vote shift may not be considered a technical conforming vote change. The em-
pirical literature generally defines conformity voting as occurring when a Justice switches
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dissent. Stewart appeared to have an open mind throughout the decision-making
process and seemed interested in a narrow ruling for Stanley that avoided the broader
ruling advocated by Marshall. He may also have communicated his open-minded-
ness through silence and been convinced by Whites careful efforts to avoid any hint
of a shift in the level of scrutiny to be applied in due process or sex discrimination
cases.380 That effort by White helped reduce the salience of the case because it avoided
any decision on a contested and important issue and thus may have helped induce
Stewarts vote switch.
B. Issue Fluidity and Attorneys Litigation Choices
The Supreme Court frequently decides cases on issues different than those argued
by the parties as it did in Stanley, which is a phenomenon known as issue fluidity.381
One study of Warren Court decisions found that the Justices addressed issues not
fully presented by the parties in 27 percent of all cases.382 The explanation has been
straightforwardJustices rule on whichever issues will attract a majority383and
is illustrated by Whites efforts to preserve his majority in Stanley by including due
process holdings to maintain Douglass vote.
A review of Stanleys litigation suggests that parties litigation choicesand not
only Supreme Court actioncan shape issue substitution. Stanleys lawyers did not
explicitly present a due process argument to the Court, relying entirely on an equal
protection challenge.384 Although Stanleys lawyers may have sought to avoid
controversial topics, they left central issues in the case unaddressed and as a result
nearly lost the case. The idea that litigation mistakes might lead to issue substitution
has empirical support. In a study of the Warren Court, Barbara Palmer found that
cases reaching the Supreme Court through State appellate courts lead to more issue
substitution than those through federal courts of appeals.385 Palmer noted a percep-
tion that state court cases were less fully litigated and less carefully decided than
federal court cases, perhaps making the Court more likely to identify the key issue
from the minority at conference to the majority, and the winning side remains the same.
Dorff & Brenner, supra note 373, at 763. In Stanley, Stewart was not in the minority at
conference. But by November 10, a new majority for Stanley was apparent, and from then
until Stewarts decision to join Whites opinion on March 30, Stanley had a majority.
380 See supra notes 31317 and accompanying text.
381 Barbara Palmer, Issue Fluidity and Agenda Setting on the Warren Court, 52 POL. RES.
Q. 39, 4041 (1999).
382 Id. at 44.
383 See, e.g., id. at 47 ([J]ustices may be willing to discard issues in the interest of pre-
serving a majority.).
384 In a 2014 interview, Stanleys lawyer, Patrick Murphy, freely admitted that he did not
raise a due process question, and said there was no strategy in that choice: Maybe we were
dumb. April 2014 Interview with Murphy, supra note 40.
385 Palmer, supra note 381, at 56.
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itself.386 Anecdotally, the effect of litigation choices on issue fluidity may be seen
in comparing Stanley with Reed v. Reedan early sex discrimination equal protec-
tion case, which was argued on the same day.387 Ruth Bader Ginsburg presented the
Court with an innovative brief arguing first that the Court should apply heightened
scrutiny to sex classifications or, in the alternative, void the particular classification
at issue under rational basis review.388 The Court chose one of those rationales and
quickly issued a rulingbarely one month after oral argument.389 Patrick Murphys
brief in Stanley limited the issue to equal protection and raised due process prece-
dents without framing them as a due process claim.390 After six months of delibera-
tion, the Court issued a ruling on the due process claim, which was not explicitly
presented to the Court.391
By illustrating Stanley, issue fluidity as a response to litigation choices (or, less
generously, errors) reframes issue fluidity as part of the Courts response to litigants.
It is not merely an internal Court function in which opinion writers seek to maintain a
majoritythough it is certainly that as well. Issue fluidity functions as a safety net for
parties like Peter Stanley whose lawyers may overlook or omit crucial arguments.
Although issue fluidity saved Stanleys case, the Courts decision-making in
Stanley also offers an illustration of issue fluiditys risks. The Court issued holdings
regarding parents substantive and procedural due process rights when those issues
were not argued by the parties.392 The lack of full development of those issues may
be illustrated in the Courts unsteady path toward a parental fitness focus. The
centrality of parental fitness to modern constitutional family law was nearly under-
minedWhites first several drafts would not have permitted states to offer parents
hearings on their childrens welfare rather than on parental fitness. Only the unique
amount of vote switching and the pressure from Marshalls threatened concurrence
saved Stanley from a dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted and ensured a
strong due process focus.
C. Stanleys Voting Fluidity and Harry Blackmuns Evolution
Harry Blackmuns changing views of parental rights made him crucial to both
establishing the rights of unwed fathers in private adoption cases and to developing
parental rights law more generally. Those changing views began in his deliberations
over Stanley.
386 Id. at 48.
387 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
388 Brief for Appellant, supra note 111, at 56.
389 Reed, 404 U.S. at 71. The Court decided Reed on November 22, 1971, after hearing
argument on October 19, 1971. Id.
390 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 13.
391 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645.
392 Id.
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Linda Greenhouse has told the story of Harry Blackmuns evolution from a
personal friend and conservative colleague of Warren Burger to an iconic liberal
Justice.393 Blackmun had been close childhood friends with Burger, and Richard
Nixon appointed both to the Court.394 Upon Blackmuns nomination, Burger urged
him to join Burgers skeptical approach toward expanding due process and equal
protection rights.395 Expecting Blackmun to hew closely to Burgers views, other
Justices clerks referred to Blackmun as [h]ip pocket Harry in his first terms on
the bench.396 Blackmun and Burger soon began splitting, personally and ideologi-
cally, in the early 1970s, and that split was well established by the late 1970s.397
Scholars have dated the shift to [a]fter a few years on the Court398and his final
votes largely aligned with Burger until they began a steady decline in 1973, and a
steeper decline in 1976.399 Blackmuns votes in family law cases track that evolu-
tionfor the State in Stanley in 1972, but for the unwed father in Caban v. Moham-
med400 in 1979 and for parents in subsequent cases.401
The internal Court documents from Stanley and Caban reveal that Blackmuns
evolution to a parents rights stalwart began with his angst about how to vote in
Stanley early in his tenure, not a later shift, and that this evolution was essential to
shaping modern constitutional family law.402 Blackmuns memos show that he
joined Burgers opinion because he was convinced by the procedural arguments, but
he was sympathetic to Stanley on the facts and willing to join an expansion of due
process and equal protection rights had they been fully litigated.403
Blackmuns leanings became clear when, in two later unwed fathers cases that
split the Court, he sided with the fathers and against Burgers position.404 The first
393 GREENHOUSE, supra note 169, at 12252.
394 Theodore W. Ruger, Justice Harry Blackmun and the Phenomenon of Judicial Prefer-
ence Change, 70 MO. L. REV. 1209, 121112 (2005).
395 GREENHOUSE, supra note 169, at 52.
396 WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 171, at 122.
397 GREENHOUSE, supra note 169, at 12252. Blackmun dated the beginning of his split
with Burger to 1974, when the Court considered United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Id. at 12224 (noting that from then on [they] grew apart). Greenhouse concluded that by
1977, Blackmun and Burgers friendship was crumbling away. Id. at 121.
398 Ruger, supra note 394, at 1212.
399 Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96 HARV. L. REV. 717, 717
n.6 (1983).
400 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
401 See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Lassiter v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 452
U.S. 18 (1981).
402 Letter from Blackmun to Burger, supra note 25; see also Letter from Blackmun to
White, supra note 26.
403 See Letter from Blackmun to White, supra note 26; see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 685, 65963 (1972) (Burger, J., and Blackmun, J. dissenting).
404 Blackmunjoined themajority in Caban v. Mohammed for the father anddissented in Lehr
v. Robertson. See Caban, 441 U.S. at 38182; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249, 276 (White, J., dissenting).
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of these cases, Caban, is the case that firmly placed Blackmun on the parents rights
side.405 That case involved a fathers challenge to a New York statute that required
the consent of an unwed motherbut not an unwed fatherto a childs adoption.406
The father, Abdiel Caban, had lived with the children and their mother from their birth
past the youngest childs second birthday.407 When the parents split up, the mother,
Maria Mohammed, took the children to live with her and Kazin Mohammed, whom
she soon married.408 Caban continued to have regular visits and other contact with
the children, but the Mohammeds petitioned for Kazim to adopt the children, and
the trial court granted that petition, citing the statute which provided that Cabans
consent was not required.409 This terminated Cabans parental rights,410 without a
hearing on Cabans parental fitness.411
Blackmun was decisive in Cabanthus providing an example of how a Justices
ideological movement can manifest itself in important legal change.412 During the
Courts deliberations, the Court split 44.413 Despite lobbying from Stewart (from
Stewarts clerks to Blackmuns clerks), Blackmun sided with the four other Justices
on Cabans side.414 Blackmuns notes on the case conclude that factually this case
is closer to Stanley than Quillion [sic] [v. Walcott], another case involving a father
who was less involved than Peter Stanley or Abdiel Caban.415 Like Peter Stanley, the
father in Caban had lived with his children for several years, and he sired and raised
the children, yet was not given a hearing on his parental fitness. If a father like Caban
could have his children adopted and his rights terminated without his consent or any
allegation or proof of unfitness, then the Constitution would offer no meaningful
protection for relationships between unwed fathers and their children. Blackmuns
shift thus ensured the Court would not issue such a holding.
Blackmun recognized the importance of his shift in Caban and tied it back to his
ongoing doubts about Stanley. Blackmuns papers include a copy of a personal note
that he wrote to Burger after he had sealed the outcome in Caban.416 Blackmun
405 Caban, 441 U.S. at 38182.
406 Id. at 38485.
407 Id. at 382.
408 Id.
409 Id. at 38284.
410 Id.
411 Id. at 384.
412 Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and
How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1487 (2007).
413 Caban, 441 U.S. at 381.
414 Memorandum from AGL to Blackmun (Jan. 23, 1979) (describing a phone call from
Stewarts clerk); Letter from Justice Blackmun to Chief Justice Burger (Jan. 29, 1979) [herein-
after Letter from Blackmun to Burger] (on file with author) (joining Powells opinion).
415 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 249 (1978); Papers of Harry Blackmun, 77-6431
Caban v. Mohammed (undated, on file with author).
416 Letter from Blackmun to Burger, supra note 414.
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wrote, I am frank to say that I am not sure how I would vote in [Stanley] were it being
presented today.417
IV. LASTING EFFECTS OF STANLEYS STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING AND
DUE PROCESS HOLDINGS
The voting and issue fluidity that shaped the Supreme Courts deliberations had
a lasting effect on constitutional family law. Most importantly, they established the
central importance of the Due Process Clause in protecting the rights of parents to
the custody and control of their children. Stanley was the first of a series of cases
which shaped the rights of unwed fathers in private adoptions.418 It serves as the
foundation of a separate string of cases that regard the due process rights of families
facing a state child protection agency effort to break them up.419
The relevance of due process is now taken for granted, but that is because of
what happened in Stanley. The Court could say in 1981 that these due process rights
are so well established that they are plain beyond the need for multiple citation,420
and in 2000 the Court referred to parental rights as perhaps the oldest of the fundamen-
tal liberty interests recognized by this Court.421 Reference to the Constitutions (now)
well-established protection of parental rights added support for the Supreme Courts
2015 decision recognizing a right to same-sex marriage.422 In 1971, however, these
statements were far from clearso unclear that Stanleys lawyers did not even
choose to argue due process. Its limited precedents regarding parental rights had
been grounded in due process, but those cases arose in the discredited Lochner era.
The Supreme Courts subsequent consideration of those doctrines reflected a both
post-New Deal respect for state action and reluctance by the Court after breaking
with the Lochner era so fully to use substantive due process to void state action.423
The Supreme Court deliberations and vote switches that led Stanley to rest on
due process affirmed that due process did, in fact, continue to protect parental
rightsa result that has shaped modern constitutional family law. It made Stanley
not only an unwed fathers rights case, but one of the leading cases on parents
rights in the Courts history.424 Through a due process analysis that explicitly relied
on the pre-New Deal cases of Meyer425 and Pierce,426 Stanley made clear that those
417 Id.
418 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
419 Id.
420 Lassiter v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
421 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
422 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
423 See supra notes 11821 and accompanying text.
424 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 5, at 64 (emphasis added).
425 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
426 Pierce v. Socy of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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cases remained good law and that the Court would continue to view parental rights
to child custody as fundamental and strongly protected against state intervention.427
That due process framework also shaped the balancing tests that have dominated
children-and-the-law casebooks and classrooms ever sincewith parents rights,
childrens rights, and state interests balanced, and sometimes in tension, in every case.
That balancing fit easily into the due process framework adopted by the Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Eldridge,428 decided three years after Stanley, and applied in
subsequent cases involving competing claims of childrens rights, parents rights,
and state authority.429
Stanleys due process holdings became the foundation of the Supreme Courts
development of a limited set of due process rights for parents in child protection
cases. Stanley established the principles that parents presumptively have the right
of custody of their children, that this right is of fundamental importance, and that the
State must prove parental unfitness if it seeks to take custody from a parent.430 One
other Court holdingthat the State must prove its case by clear and convincing evi-
dence before terminating parental rights431depends on Stanleys due process holding.
So does the Courts analysis that the rights of even long-standing foster parents do
not trump those of biological parents.432 A decision that focused on equal protection
issues between mothers and fathers would have had far less precedential value in
these later child protection casesthose later cases had nothing to do with overt sex
discrimination and everything to do with the rights of parents regardless of sex.
Stanleys due process focus also shapes the analysis for a host of other issues. De-
termining the rights of children committed to mental institutions by parents begins
with a discussion of parents right to control children.433 Analyzing parental consent to
abortion and judicial bypass laws begins with analyzing the extent of parents due
process right to control their children.434 State statutes permitting nonparents to seek
visitation rights require constitutional deference to fit parents determinations.435
When the State can require the provision of medical care to a child over a parents
objection begins with a due process right that traces back to Stanley.
427 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
428 424 U.S. 319, 33235 (1976).
429 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
599600 (1979); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 84849
(1977). Some have criticized the balancing of constitutional rights as failing to address ade-
quately how poverty affects child welfare cases and catalyzing conflict between the State and
families. See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLAL. REV. 637 (2006).
430 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
431 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 746.
432 Smith, 431 U.S. at 84247.
433 Parham, 442 U.S. at 60103. Chief Justice Burgers majority opinion in Parham does
not cite Stanley, but, by citing the older due process cases that preceded it, Burger reaffirmed
Stanleys central holding that the Due Process Clause protects parental rights. See id. at 602.
434 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 63739 (1979).
435 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 6869 (2000).
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Stanley v. Illinois is most frequently cited as the first case in the unwed fathers
quartetStanley plus three cases that followed, all involving private adoption
disputeswhich established that the Due Process Clause provides unwed fathers
with an opportunity interest in their children and, when fathers seize that interest,
procedural rights are due before that legal relationship is severed.436 Locating these
rights in the Due Process Clause results directly from the decision-making in Stanley.
Stanley also framed the question that future cases had to decide: it held that a father
who sired and raised his child had fundamental due process rights to custody
making it necessary for a rule to distinguish between fathers who can and cannot
claim such rights and requiring analysis of which relationships are worthy of con-
stitutional protection.437
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF STANLEYS FULL HISTORY
The full story of Stanley v. Illinois has significant implications for the study of
Supreme Court decision-making and helps explain modern constitutional family
law, which rests on the Stanley decision. What we now take for grantedthat the
Due Process Clause protects parents right to care, custody, and control of their
children, that this right must be balanced against state interests in protecting chil-
dren, and that the State must prove parental unfitness before taking custody of
childrendepends on this case. Yet the path to those holdings has never before been
told. The full history of Stanley v. Illinois provides greater appreciation for the doc-
trinal shift toward a due process analysis that Stanleys unique path at the Supreme
Court led to. It was far from certain that the Court would choose to place family
integrity rights under the Due Process Clauses protectionso uncertain that Stan-
leys lawyer declined to explicitly raise a due process argument. The Court only
applied the Due Process Clause through compromises to form a majority on a Court
whose members had changed their votes in large numbers.
The child protection context from which Stanley arose leads to a set of other ques-
tions for future work in constitutional family law. Stanley is best known as the first
of several Supreme Court cases addressing the rights of unwed fathers in adoptions,
and is typically treated either as an adoption case or as a forerunner to later adoption
436 See infra note 438.
437 See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 5, at 65 (noting that Stanley did not clarify if all bio-
logical fathers or only those who had raised their children had constitutional rights). This
effort continues to the present day. Stanley led to the Courts rule in Lehr v. Robertson that
unwed fathers have an opportunity interest in their children, but can lose constitutional rights
if they fail to act on that interest. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). That rule continues to lead to signif-
icant commentary, variation across states, and a frequent lack of clarity about what to do
when unmarried parents have a dispute about their children. Naomi Cahn & June Carbone,
Whos the Father?, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 55, 56 (2013).
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cases.438 Even leading children and the law casebooks (which address child protec-
tion law) classify Stanley as an adoption case.439 It is the only one of those cases,
however, to arise in a foster care context, and the full facts of the caseincluding Peter
Stanleys adjudicated neglect of his eldest daughterdemonstrate that the State was
focused on protecting Stanleys children from a father it viewed as unfit.440 Whether
the State succeeded in such goal is unclear, and the States decision to avoid litigat-
ing its real concerns may have undermined its ultimate goals.441 Do state agency
lawyers avoid litigating parental fitness by taking advantage of modern analogs to
the unwed father statute in Stanley? Do child protection courts apply doctrines that
resolve the questions raised by Stanley, or do they ignore them?442 Answering such
questions begins with a complete understanding of Stanley itself.
Such a complete understanding reveals important insight about Supreme Court
decision-making beyond family law. It shows that strategic voting occursJustice
Brennan voted differently than his true preferences at the conference in an effort to
shape the Courts action closer to his liking. Moreover, Stanleys path from a deci-
sion for the State at the conference to a weak due process holding several weeks
later, to ultimately a strong due process holding illustrates the complex dynamic in
which each Justices votes and perspectives about a case shape the ultimate out-
come. Stanley became a due process case because Justice Douglas made his vote
depend on it, and it became a strong parents rights holding because Justice Marshall
threatened to concur separately and perhaps deprive Justice White of a clear major-
ity. Responding to the pressures imposed by Douglass and Marshalls views and
438 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The academy now generally discusses
Stanley only as the first of the unwed fathers quartet. See, e.g., Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Break-
ing Up a Family or Putting It Back Together Again: Refining the Preference in Favor of the
Parent in Third-Party Custody Cases, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1045, 1074 (1996); Meyer,
supra note 35, at 75860; Laura Oren, Thwarted Fathers or Pop-Up Pops?: How to De-
termine When Putative Fathers Can Block the Adoption of Their Newborn Children, 40 FAM.
L.Q. 153, 15758 (2006). In one leading recent work, this story has been condensed to a
footnote citing Stanley and Lehr and the rule that emerged from that quartet. Clare Huntington,
Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167,
203 n.198 (2015). Mass media publications similarly present Stanley as a landmark case
providing rights to unwed fathers generally and the first case in a series leading to Lehr v.
Robertson. See, e.g., Maillard, supra note 35.
439 See, e.g., ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 15, at 665 (placing Stanley in a chapter on Adop-
tion rather than Abuse and Neglect or Foster Care); PETER N. SWISHER ET AL., FAMILY
LAW:CASES,MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 66869 (2d ed. 1998) (placing Stanley in a chapter
on Adoption).
440 See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 64647.
441 See supra Part II.D.
442 For a brief exploration of these questions, see Josh Gupta-Kagan, In re Sanders and the
Resurrection of Stanley v. Illinois, 5 CALIF.L.REV.CIR. 383 (2014), http://www.californialawre
view.org/in-re-sanders-and-the-resurrection-of-stanley-v-illinois/ [http://perma.cc/R47R-T5SM].
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Chief Justice Burgers dissent shaped the ultimate decision as much, if not more
than, the authors initial views.
Stanley also was shaped by the lawyers who, with the benefit of hindsight, made
a strategic error in focusing entirely on equal protection and overlooking due process
arguments. This led several Justices to wrestle with the case more than necessary and
ultimately cost Justice Blackmuns vote. It also caused the Courts issue fluidityand
demonstrates that issue fluidity is not merely a result of the Justices interactions
with each other, but a response to the legal arguments that each party raises in any
given case.
